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Abstract 
Purpose: Mental state discourse between parents and their children is linked to the 
development of children’s capacity to represent theirs and others mental states 
(Carpendale & Lewis, 2004). Conversations about others and one’s own mental 
world may be crucial for the development of social understanding. Methods: 
MEDLINE, PsycINFO, ERIC, HMIC, MWIC, Social Policy and Practice databases 
were searched electronically producing ten studies exploring the relationship 
between parental use of Mental State Language (MSL) and a) subsequent children’s 
use of MSL or b) subsequent ToM performance were included in this review. Only 
studies employing a longitudinal design were included. Results: All but one study 
revealed a positive relationship between parental use of MSL and subsequent use of 
MSL or performance on a ToM task in children. However, a wide range of 
methodological issues are highlighted. Conclusion: Research to date, despite not 
being of high volume, supports the hypothesis that parental use of MSL promotes 
social cognitive development in children. MSL is a promising window to investigate 
the effect of social context on social cognitive development. However, future 
research is required, and would benefit from focusing on the total amount of MSL 
children encounter in their environment (i. e. not only mother-child dyads). 
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Self-knowledge comes from knowing other men. 
Johann Wolfgang Von Goethe 
 
Introduction 
The remarkable immaturity and vulnerability of newborn human primates and their 
unusually extended period of youth development has long been noted (e.g. Montagu, 
1989). Human infants are born helpless and about one year premature compared 
with apes (Montagu, 1989) leaving the human infant very dependent on adults for an 
extended period. Most scientists have assumed that the slow maturation process was 
merely a co-product of a selection process for another characteristic: intelligence 
(see Bjorklund, 2007). Increasing intelligence, and especially an increase in social 
intelligence, is assumed to have driven evolution of larger brains, housed inside 
larger heads. A complex and large brain takes a lot of time to develop, and in 
humans much of this development has to occur after birth, because bipedalism limits 
the size of the maternal birth canal, which has been assumed to constrain the head 
size of newborns (Bjorklund, 2007). There have been arguments however how the 
extended period of immaturity, both on a physical as well as cognitive level, is 
adaptive (e.g. Bjorklund and Green, 1992) and natural selection may have favoured 
a long childhood because it had benefits that outweighed its costs (Bjorklund, 2007). 
Bjorklund et al. (1992) have argued that some aspects of children’s cognition may 
render them optimal for the acquisition of social-cognitive milestones such as 
attachment and language. 
Bowlby (1969/1982) highlighted how attachment behaviour is crucial for the 
development of a representational system of mental states. That is, it is only in the 
presence of a caregiver that infants have a chance to develop internal working 
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models that allow an understanding of psychological characteristics of other people, 
and differentiating those states of others from the self (Fonagy, 2001). Internal 
working models enable a child, and later the adult, to interpret experiences of self 
and others in terms of intentional attributes, such as desires, emotions, and beliefs 
and intentions. As Fonagy (2001) highlights, this environmental feature of a 
reflecting adult is crucial for the expression of genes, as the representational system 
of a child (and later the adult) may be the mechanism by which it is determined 
which genotype is expressed in the phenotype. Therefore, pre-maturity and extended 
period of youth in human primates have adaptive interpersonal functions. The 
human infant can only acquire representational systems that are the basis of complex 
social cognitive functioning in the presence of others, making it necessary to come 
out of the womb and complete brain development in a social context. Montagu 
(1989) most fittingly describes, there is an “advantage of immaturity: a womb with a 
view”. It is in the context of attachment that cognitive, especially social cognitive, 
development can take place (Fonagy, 2001). 
This important role of social context for social cognitive development very much 
resonates with Vygotsky’s work (1978; Lloyd & Fernyhough, 1999). He also 
proposed that development is a social process from birth onward, which is fostered 
by a collaboration between adult and child, within the child’s zone of proximal 
development:  
“The zone of proximal development defines those functions that have not yet 
matured but are in the process of maturation, functions that will mature 
tomorrow but are currently in an embryonic state. These functions could be 
termed the ‘buds’ or ‘flowers’ of development rather than the ‘fruits’ of 
development.” (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 86). 
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As to the role of adults and peers he specifies: 
“We propose that an essential feature of learning is that it creates the zone of 
proximal development; that is, learning awakens a variety of developmental 
processes that are able to operate only when the child is interacting with 
people in his environment and in collaboration with his peers.” (Vygotsky, 
1978, p. 90). 
Vygotsky’s (1978; Lloyd & Fernyhough, 1999) process of ‘internalisation’ is a 
helpful theoretical concept by which the role of mental state discourse can influence 
development. According to Vygotsky’s theory, reasoning about mental states 
becomes internalised in children from participation in interpersonal discourse about 
thoughts and feelings about self and others with their parents and caregivers.  
Mental state discourse between parents and their children has been proposed to be 
one significant contributor to the development of children’s capacity to represent 
theirs and others mental states (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004). Conversations about 
others and one’s own mental world have been proposed to be crucial for the 
development of social understanding. A source of evidence for this comes from 
research with deaf children. Deaf children with hearing parents are delayed in their 
development of false belief understanding, whereas deaf children with deaf parents 
are not. The reason for this may be that hearing parents are not as fluent at sign 
language as deaf parents, and therefore their children may not be exposed to 
complex conversations about people’s actions, beliefs and emotions (Peterson & 
Siegal 2000; Woolfe, Want, & Siegal, 2002). Further evidence for the relevance of 
mental state discourse is that types of family talk about mental states have been 
reported to relate to later performance on false belief tasks (e. g. Dunn et al. 1991). 
Meins et al. (1999, 1998) have also shown that mothers, who think of their children 
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in mentalistic terms, and most likely talk to their children about the psychological 
world, have children who are more advanced in understanding beliefs than are other 
children. Astington and Jenkins (1999) found that earlier language abilities predict 
later false belief performance but earlier false belief competence does not predict 
later language abilities, supporting the conclusion that language is important in 
social cognitive development. 
Mental state language (MSL) has been defined by various researchers, and coded 
according to a variety of systems (e. g. Bartsch and Wellman, 1995; Ruffman et al., 
2002). Talk about mental states can be divided into words that refer to cognitive and 
emotional states, as well as desires. Words describing cognitive states included 
believe, think, know, believe, wonder, remember, forget, guess, pretend, understand, 
and expect. Terms related to mind, imagination, intellect, or metacognition are also 
included in the category of cognitive mental state language. Emotional mental state 
language includes words relating to feelings (e.g. happy, sad, angry, cross, grumpy, 
excited, hurt). Desire terms include want, hope, wish, desire, prefer, keen on, need, 
and care, as well as phrases that reflect desire states. MSL appears to provide a 
promising construct through which to explore the development of the child’s use of 
MSL and understandings of mental states. Given the above evidence on the 
relationship between parental use of MSL and the development of children’s social 
cognitive ability, it is timely to review the literature in a more systematic way.   
 
Objectives 
Studying, or even merely summarizing, the evidence supporting a social 
interactionist framework in which social environment input facilitates the 
development of children’s social cognition is inherently a complex task. Due to the 
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social environment being such a complex one, with multiple interacting factors, 
investigation of isolated factors is hardly possible. In this systematic review an 
attempt is made at focusing on a more defined factor, namely that of MSL. But as 
quickly becomes apparent, a true focus on just one factor is not possible even in this 
case. Multiple factors affect the level of mental state utterances, and the concept 
possibly overlaps heavily with other factors such as and carer attunement attachment 
(Meins, Fernyhough, Wainwright, Das Gupta, Fradley, & Tuckey, 2002). In 
addition, as the question is asked in a developmental context, the object of study (the 
child) is continuously developing. Therefore studying any causal relationships is 
further complicated. 
In the following an attempt is made in reflecting this complex nature by focusing on 
several specific questions, and an additional section to cover the rich complexity of 
methodological issues that are inherent in the subject. 
The current review will address the following questions:  
1) Does parental Mental State Language (MSL) effect child’s subsequent 
MSL? 
2) Does parental MSL effect child’s subsequent Theory of Mind (ToM)? 
3) What are the methodological issues to consider when investigating the 
causal nature of parental MSL on children’s subsequent MSL or ToM? 
4) Are there consistent ways in which future research of the relationship 
between caregiver and child use of MSL can still be strengthened? 
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Methodology 
Search strategy 
Search terms were initially drawn up by identifying the key components of the 
review questions and creating all possible permutations. The resulting search terms 
were then used to conduct a search using Ovid MEDLINE(R) <1950 to 2010>, 
PsycINFO, ERIC - Educational Resources Information Center <1965 to May 2010>, 
HMIC - Health Management Information Consortium, MWIC - Maternity and 
Infant Care <1971 to May 2010>, EMBASE <1980 to 2010>, Social Policy and 
Practice. The following key search terms were combined using the Boolean AND 
operator: 
1) (children or childhood or child or toddler* or pre?school or infan* or baby 
or babies or youth or young person* or young people or teen* or adolescen*)  
2) (mental state language* or mental state expression* or mental state 
utterance* or mental state discourse). 
Duplicate references were removed from the results of this search. All of the 
remaining references’ abstracts were inspected and those not meeting inclusion 
criteria were removed. All studies filtered into the inclusion category were then 
examined at full-text level prior to inclusion. Key papers were further hand-searched 
for references that may have been missed by electronic search strategy. 
Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
 Criteria for inclusion: 
1. Studies published in the English language, without time constraint. 
2. Studies measuring use of mental state language in parent. 
3. Studies measuring use of mental state language in child or other ToM 
related measurement (e.g. false belief task).  
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4. Studies using a prospective design, measuring parental use of MSL at an 
earlier time point before measurement of child’s use of MSL or other ToM 
related measure. 
 Criteria for exclusion: 
 1. Studies not published in English.  
 2. Studies that only measure mental state language at one time point. 
3. Studies involving clinical populations (e.g. deaf children, children with 
cochlea implants, children on the autistic spectrum). 
4. Studies that use an experimental manipulation (e.g. training parents in use 
of mental state language). 
5. Studies of insufficient quality to obtain information on how mental state 
utterances were recorded and coded. 
6. Unpublished dissertations or single case research designs, as well as 
research collections in book form.  
Results of literature search 
The search and exclusion process is presented in Figure 1. Electronic database 
searching using the specified terms and hand-searching reference lists of the key 
papers identified initially produced a total of 63 potentially relevant studies. Of these 
studies, 39 were excluded following application of the inclusion and exclusion 
criteria and a further 14 duplications were also excluded. On this basis 10 studies 
were included in the current review. 
______________________________ 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
______________________________ 
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Quality Ratings 
The structured rating scale developed to assess the quality of studies under review is 
presented in Table 1. All papers were rated using this scale, and a sub-set of papers 
was rated by a second reviewer. The rating allowed a structured overview of the 
variation in methodological quality of the papers included in this review, and guided 
the presentation of the result section. A summary of each reviewed study is 
presented in Table 2. 
_____________________________ 
INSERT TALBE 1 ABOUT HERE 
_____________________________ 
_____________________________ 
INSERT TALBE 2 ABOUT HERE 
_____________________________ 
 
Results 
The results of the review are considered in four sections as defined by the review 
questions. Firstly, the results relating to the relationship between parental and 
subsequent child MSL, and secondly ToM performance, will be presented. This will 
be followed by an analysis of the range of methodological issues, and how the range 
of studies included in this study do, or do not, account for these pertinent to the 
interpretation of these studies. Finally, and leading on from methodological issues, 
ways in which future research of the relationship between caregiver and child use of 
MSL can still be strengthened, will be explored. 
Parental mental state language and child’s subsequent mental state language 
Six studies included in this review (Furrow et al., 1992; Ruffman et al., 2002; 
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Jenkins et al., 2003; Rudek et al., 2005; Tamoepeau et al., 2006, 2008) measured 
child’s subsequent MSL, of which five reported positive relationship between 
maternal (or family, in the case of Jenkins et al., 2003) use of MSL and subsequent 
use in their children. In the following a short overview of the five studies revealing a 
positive interaction will be given, as well as one study (Rudek et al., 2005), which 
did not reveal an interaction. See Table 2 for an overview of studies, and Figure 2 
for an overview of the duration of longitudinal studies included in this section.  
______________________________ 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
______________________________ 
Jenkins et al. (2003) studied 37 children over six observational sessions (duration: 
each 90 min) in the homes of participants at Time 1 (age M = 2.4 yrs) and 2 (age M 
= 4.4 yrs). Data were collected in an equal division of mother-only and mother-
father sessions. Families were not given any task but carried on with their daily 
activities (except video games or watching TV, which they were discouraged from 
doing), and an experimenter was present for recording of sessions at all times.  This 
is the only study included that explicitly studied family-wide use of mental state 
language (mother, father, older and younger siblings). Rates of mental state terms 
(rates of talk per hour were calculated) were low at both time points, but varied 
greatly between families. MSL was divided into cognitive, desire and feeling talk. A 
hierarchical regression analysis, investigating family members’ mental state talk on 
younger siblings’ mental state talk, revealed that family member's cognitive (Time 
1) was a significant predictor of change in younger children's cognitive talk, 
accounting for an additional 9% of the variance in change in children's cognitive talk 
(Time 2). A similar result was found for feeling talk, where family members feeling 
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talk explained 10% of the variance in change in children’s feeling talk. No such 
effect was observed for desire talk. Unfortunately, Jenkins et al. (2003) did not 
report results across all types of MSL, to allow an evaluation of the question 
whether overall family members’ MSL has an effect on childrens’ MSL. To control 
for effects of language, Jenkins et al. (2003) determined whether younger children's 
mean length of utterance (MLU) at Time 1 was a significant predictor of younger 
children's mental state talk. This was only the case for cognitive talk, and therefore 
MLU was entered in the hierarchical regression analysis for this type of mental state 
language. Even after taking children’s general language competence into account, as 
well as their specific use of cognitive terms (at Time 1), their change in cognitive 
talk was predicted by their exposure to cognitive talk by mothers, fathers and older 
siblings.  
Taumoepeau et al. (2006, 2008) conducted a study of 74 (at Time 1 and 2; and 72 at 
Time 3) parent infant dyads with three time points (2006 paper: Time 1, 14.8 mths; 
and Time 2, 24.2 mths.; 2008 paper: Time 3, 32.8 mths.). The majority of 
participants were mother-infant pairs (with only three father-infant pairs, for which 
reason Taumoepeau et al., 2006 and 2008 only refer to mothers). They were 
instructed to engage in a short picture-describing task in the lab environment (Time 
1, 2 and 3), during which experimenter left the room. The pictures used for this task 
depicted adults and children expressing a range of emotions (60% of all pictures), as 
well as people and animals. This is important to note, as the specific task 
participants were asked to engage in carried a bias towards MSL. In addition, only 
parental MSL was measured directly (i.e. coded from session transcripts), whereas 
child MSL was acquired by parental rating-scales. At all three time points, the 
MacArthur Communicative Development Inventory (MCDI: Fenson, Dale, Reznick, 
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Bates, Hartung, Pethick, & Reilly, 1993) was used to rate child language as well as 
MSL. At Time 1 mostly receptive language was measured (parents were asked to 
indicate which words or gestures their child understood or produced). At Time 2, 
they indicated only words that their children produced. In addition, a supplementary 
checklist of internal state was included as part of the general MCDI checklist. At 
Time 1 this included terms of mental state, physical state, emotion, and the senses. 
At Time 2 a further set of cognitive terms and modulation of assertion were added. 
In order to control for verbosity in parents, mental state utterances were examined as 
a percentage of total utterances. Linear regression analyses were used to investigate 
the predictive value of parental MSL. Parental use of desire language at Time 1 was 
a unique predictor of child total MSL at Time 2 (Taumoepeau et al., 2006). There 
was no relation between child MSL and later mother desire language, suggesting a 
unidirectional relation between early mother desire language and later child MSL. 
Parental emotion, desire, and think/know talk at Time 2 accounted for 10% of the 
variance over and above the variance attributed to other child and parent variables at 
Time 3 (e.g. SES, parent-rated child language ability). However, it is particularly 
parental talk about thoughts and knowledge that emerges as the more consistent 
predictor of child MSL at Time 3. Taumoepeau et al. (2008) highlight changes in 
what type of mother talk is important—first desire talk about the child, then 
think/know talk about others—are crucial to understanding the specifics of how 
mothers help children.  
Ruffman et al. (2002) studied 82 mother-child dyads at Time 1 (age M = 3.01 yrs), 
but only 79 dyads at Time 2 (age M = 3.41 yrs), and 72 dyads at Time 3 (age M = 
4.04 yrs). Ruffman et al. (2002) used a lab-based picture-describing task to collect 
MSL data in mothers. However, at Time 1 the picture set was of people engaged in 
Developmental Pathways of Paranoid Thinking 
 21 
common tasks, whereas Time 2 and 3 were of more emotionally charged situations, 
which leaves open the possibility that they differed in the amount of mental state 
talk that they provoked. Partial correlations between mother mental state utterances 
and later child mental state utterances were significant for all comparisons (Time 1-
2: r = .41, Time 1-3: r = .51, Time 2-3: r = .39; taking into account child MSL at 
Time 1). Child utterances never predicted later mother utterances, which the authors 
interpret as indication for a unique role for mother utterances. Linear regressions in 
which mother mental state utterances were directly compared to language ability, to 
determine which accounted for more variance in MSL use in children, were not 
reported. This type of linear regression was however reported for subsequent ToM 
performance (see next section), and revealed that language ability was highly related 
to ToM understanding, but that mother MSL use explained a comparable or even 
greater amount of unique variance in children’s ToM performance. Unfortunately 
we cannot assume that this result would have been the same for MSL use, and 
therefore it is regrettable this additional analysis was not reported for MSL use in 
children. 
Furrow et al. (1992) studied 19 mother-child dyads at two time points (Time 1: age 
M = 2 yrs.; Time 2: age M = 3 yrs.). They, similar to Jenkins et al. (2003), used a 
home-base observation, without a specific task. Mothers told that the purpose of the 
study was to look at mother and child conversations during mealtime, reading time, 
and playtime. Mothers were told to follow their normal pattern of interaction as 
much as possible. Proportions were calculated using a denominator for all 
comprehensible utterances during that session for that age. Mothers’ use of mental 
terms at Time 1 predicted their children’s use of these terms a year later (r = .50, p = 
.05). Furrow et al.’s (1992) study is the most methodologically weak study included 
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in this review that investigated the prospective relationship between maternal and 
child MSL. It took no account of other variables, such as child language ability, 
child’s level of MSL use at Time 1, SES and education level of mother, although the 
authors do highlight that a complex reciprocal relationship is possible. It should be 
noted that this study was the first to look at the prospective relationship between 
maternal and child MSL in a systematic way, paving the path for future research on 
the central importance in our understanding of the development of children’s theory 
of mind. 
Rudek et al. (2005) studied 21 mother-infant dyads at two time points (Time 1: age 
M = 30 mths., Time 2: M = 42.4 mths). This study different from all of the above in 
that the context in which data on MSL were collected was very different. 
Participating mother-child dyads were asked to talk about three past experiences. A 
researcher guided the mother in selecting an event to discuss (special, one time 
experiences that they had with their children in the past; e.g. trip to the zoo, picnic, 
visit with grandparents). Mothers were invited to elicit their children’s recall of 
these events in as natural way as possible. Only utterances that were on task (i.e. 
reminiscing about past event) were included in coding. Mediational analysis 
revealed that mother’s mental term use at Time 1 no longer significantly accounted 
for variance in children’s Time 2 use once children’s Time 1 use was also included 
in the equation. Only children’s Time 1 use uniquely predicted use at Time 2. The 
Time 1 use of MSL by mothers and children was a better at predicting their 
respective use at Time 2, than the Time 1 use of their partner. These results differ 
from the above studies that all revealed a significant relationship between parental 
MSL at Time 1 and child MSL at Time 2. However, as the task under which the 
MSL data were collected is so different from previous studies, it is unclear whether 
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specific memory-related conversation is a determining factor. The fact that no 
association between general language abilities and both mothers’ and children’s 
mental state term were found, as several other studies have, may indicate that the 
specific context of data collection may be in deed relevant. In addition, Rudek et 
al.’s (2005) sample is relatively small, which inevitably will have led to a smaller 
range on both language, and specifically MSL, in the data.  
Overall, the majority of studies included in this review show that parental use of 
MSL does predict subsequent child’s use of MSL. The majority of studies (Jenkins 
et al., 2003; Taumoepeau et al., 2006, 2008; Rudek et al., 2005) did include general 
language ability in their analysis, to investigate whether variance in use of MSL was 
merely due to variance in overall language ability. In the studies by Jenkins et al. 
(2003) and Taumoepeau et al. (2006, 2008) this was done in the more 
methodologically diligent way by including language ability (e.g. MLU) in the 
regression analysis. Rudek et al. (2005) approached the question of a general 
language ability confound, but did so in a separate correlation analysis, which 
revealed that increases in children’s MSL use during reminiscing are not simply 
related to increases in their language skills. There was one significant correlation 
however, between language ability at Time 1 and children’s Time 2 use of mental 
terms to express desires (r = .48, p = .05). This indicates that an inclusion of 
language ability in the regression analysis would have been desirable. 
All studies above, bar Furrow et al. (1992), controlled for Time 1 use of MSL in 
children. This satisfies the methodological consideration that later use of MSL is 
likely to be highly correlated with early use. This way the variance explained by 
parental early use of MSL can more safely be interpreted as causal in children’s later 
use. 
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Parental mental state language and child’s subsequent Theory of Mind 
Seven studies included in this review (Dunn et al., 1991a, 1991b; Meins et al., 2002; 
Ruffman et al., 2002; Symons et al., 2006; Taumoepeau et al., 2006, 2008) 
measured child’s subsequent ToM performance, and all reported positive 
relationship between parental use of mental state language and subsequent ToM 
performance in their children. However, the tasks used and specific interactions 
tested varied widely between studies. Therefore in the following a short overview of 
the studies will be given. See Figure 3 for an overview of the duration of 
longitudinal studies included in this section. As can be seen in Figure 3, first and 
final data collection differed widely between studies. In addition, the distance 
between first and final data point differed greatly, with three studies (Dunn et al., 
1991a; Meins et al., 2002; Symons et al., 2006) spanning on average across 
approximately 43 months. Dunn et al. (1991b), Ruffman et al. (2002) and 
Taumoepeau et al.’s (2006, 2008) studies on the other hand spanned over an average 
of 12 months. This variability is important to note given that the subject matter of 
investigation in all studies involved developmental processes. 
______________________________ 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
______________________________ 
Meins et al. (2002) studied 57 mother-infant dyads (Time 1: age M = 6 mths., Time 
2: age M = 45 mths., Time 3: age M = 48 mths.), and used a lab-based free play 
session, where mothers were not given any specific instructions, other than being 
invited to play with their children as they would at home. Interactions were 
videotaped, and the experimenter was not present. Mother’s behaviors were 
classified for maternal mind-mindedness according to Meins et al.’s (2001) system 
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of five categories: maternal responsiveness to change in infant’s direction of gaze, 
maternal responsiveness to infant’s object-directed action, imitation, encouragement 
of autonomy, and mind-related comments. In this review it is only the final category 
that shall be considered, and yet it is important to keep in mind that this variable 
may be somewhat different to MSL measurements in other studies. Apart from 
comments on the infant’s mental state, mental process, level of emotional 
engagement, the infant’s attempts to manipulate other people’s beliefs, the mother 
‘‘putting words into her infant’s mouth’’ so that her discourse took the form of a 
dialogue was also coded (Meins et al., 2001). As Meins et al. (2001) argued 
previously as being necessary, an independent measure of whether each mind-
related comment was appropriate or inappropriate was added. To control for 
verbosity, comments in the appropriate and inappropriate mental comments 
categories were calculated as proportion of the total number of maternal comments 
produced during the session. The data on ToM performance were collected in the 
family home environment, as opposed to the measure of mental comments by 
mothers at Time 1. Children were tested on three ToM tasks. Firstly they took part 
in the appearance–reality task (Flavell et al., 1983), in which children are shown an 
object whose appearance is deceptive (e.g. a sponge that looked like a football, a 
frog pencil sharpener). Children passed this test when they could correctly answer 
two test questions: (a) ‘‘What is this really and truly?’’ and (b) ‘‘When you look at it 
with your eyes right now, does it look like a [football] or does it look like a 
[sponge]?’’ Secondly, children took part in the deceptive box task (Hogrefe et al., 
1986), in which they were asked what they thought was inside a candy tube. 
Children were then shown that the tube contained pencils, rather than candies. Once 
the lid was replaced to the tube, children were introduced to a toy animal and asked 
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to predict what the toy animal would think was in the tube. The final ToM test was 
an unexpected transfer task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), more commonly referred to 
at the Sally-Anne task (Leslie & Frith, 1988). A forward regression revealed that 
children’s language scores were the best predictor of overall ToM performance (R
2
 
= .16, T = 3.29, ! = .41, p = .005), followed by appropriate mind-related comments 
(R
2
 = .11, T = 2.80, ! = .33, p = .01). Mothers’ appropriate mind-related comments 
accounted for 11% of the variance in overall ToM performance. It should be noted 
that no analysis for was reported for the predictive value of all mental state 
utterances by mothers at Time 1 and children’s ToM performance at Time 2, but 
only for appropriate mind-related comments. Although maternal sensitivity (Meins 
et al., 1998) was positively correlated with mother’s proportional scores for 
appropriate mind-related comments, this variable was not a significant predictor of 
ToM performance. This indicates that Meins’ variable of mind-related comments (or 
MSL for the purpose of this review) is to some extend independent from maternal 
sensitivity (although they were found to be significantly correlated).  
Symons et al. (2006) studied 43 dyads at two time points (Time 1: age M = 
24.7mths., Time 2: age M = 69.2 mths). Their study was similar to Meins et al.’s 
(2002) study in that at Time 1 mothers were asked to play with their toddler in a 
laboratory setting for ten minutes, which was videotaped, transcribed and coded for 
mental state utterances. Statements were coded for appropriateness according to 
Meins et al. (2002). However, different from Meins et al. (2002), frequency counts, 
as opposed to proportions of total talk, were used. An estimate for children’s 
language ability was included, in form of MLU. ToM performance was measured 
with two sets of tests at Time 2. Firstly, six items of a deceptive box task (e.g., the 
Smarties task, Gopnick & Astington, 1988) were used. Secondly, children 
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completed five items of the unexpected transfer task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). 
ToM was positively associated with the mother’s appropriate desire state language, 
but not her appropriate cognitive state language, nor any other dependent measures. 
A hierarchical regression was conducted in which the background variables (child’s 
age, SES, maternal sensitivity) were entered at step 1. The child ’s language 
measures were entered at step 2, and then appropriate maternal desire state language 
was entered in step 3. Neither background variables nor language ability accounted 
for a significant amount of variance. Maternal appropriate desire state language 
accounted for an additional 11 per cent of the variance in the ToM performance. It is 
possible that child desire state language accounted for their ToM performance rather 
than maternal appropriate desire state language, particularly as these two language 
measures were positively related. Therefore the regression was rerun with the child 
desire state language as an additional predictor at step 3. This did not affect the 
additional variance accounted for by this step nor the total variance accounted for by 
this step. However, this overall regression equation was not significant after step 3, 
and neither child nor maternal appropriate desire state language were significant 
predictors of ToM. Unconditional counts of neither desire nor cognitive state words 
by mothers were predictive of their later ToM, and the desire state language of 
mothers was only predictive of their ToM when it was designated as appropriate. 
Unfortunately, language ability was not measured at Time 2 in this study, therefore 
not allowing control for this influence on ToM performance at Time 2. In addition, 
the mother’s level of MSL and child’s language ability were assessed both at Time 
1, from the same play session. This makes it difficult to interpret the interrelations of 
the language of mother and child, as either an individual difference of a session, 
dyad, or person. 
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As the studies by Taumoepeau et al. (2006, 2008) have been described in the 
previous section, only the two ToM tests and results will be mentioned here. Firstly, 
a child emotion situation task was used, in which children were tested at the second 
time point on their ability to discern how a person felt. Children were presented with 
cartoon-style vignettes designed to elicit a specific emotional reaction from the 
protagonist (e.g., a boy being chased by a lion). The protagonist’s face was blanked 
out and the only clues to how the protagonist was feeling were from situational 
clues. Children were then presented with the original picture of the person-situation 
and two other pictures of a person’s head expressing a choice of two emotions, from 
which they had to choose one. Secondly, a child body emotion task was used. In this 
task children were also tested on their ability to discern how a person was feeling, 
but this time from their body position. The person’s face was not visible and the 
only clues were through body position (e.g., head in hands). The child was then 
required to point to the face that best depicted how the person was feeling. Mothers 
were administered two emotion recognition tasks as well. The first task, taken from 
Sullivan and Ruffman (2004), tested their ability to match a verbal emotional 
expression with a corresponding picture. The second task examined mothers’ ability 
to match a picture of an emotional expression with a corresponding emotion word. 
Linear regression was used to examine which of the significant mother MSL 
variables accounted for the most variance in later child emotion situation task 
performance. In the first step all potentially confounding variables were entered 
(e.g., SES, mother emotion task performance, total Time 1 child language, other 
significant correlates) with the targeted predictor variable entered in the second step. 
Only mother desire talk at Time 1 remained a significant correlate and predictor of 
later child emotion situation task performance at Time 2 (R
2
 = .08, T = 2.08, ! = .28, 
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p < .05). Mother think/know talk at Time 2 was the only predictor of children’s 
performance on the emotion situation task at Time 3 performance (R
2
 = .11, T = 
2.65, ! = .38, p < .05). Mother talk about thinking and knowing accounted for 11% 
of the variance, over and above child language and emotion situation task 
performance at Time 2, mother performance on the emotion tasks and SES. 
Although mother talk about desires continued to contribute variance in later child 
talk about mental states, mother talk about thoughts and knowledge emerged as a 
more consistent correlate. As with Symons et al.’s (2006) study, the MSL measure 
for mother and child were acquired from the same session, leaving open the 
possibility of interrelationship. 
As Ruffman et al.’s (2002) study has been described in the above section, additional 
information on ToM tasks and results will be described only. A false-belief transfer 
task was given at all three time points and was based on the study by Wimmer and 
Perner (1983), a desire–emotion task was based on Wellman and Wooley (1990), 
and an emotion–situations task was based on Denham (1986). At Time 3, the ToM 
task increased in complexity, and children were also asked for justifications (e.g. 
“Why will she think there are crayons inside?”). At Time 3 an additional ambiguity 
task, based on a study by Taylor (1988), was given to the children. The combination 
of ToM tasks used in this study is different to the previously discussed studies, in 
that it involved a greater number of tasks, as well as more complex versions of tasks 
at Time 3. Linear regression analyses were used. Mothers’ mental state utterances 
were predictors of later ToM when partialing out early ToM performance, early 
child mental state utterances, early language, and maternal education (SES). 
Mothers’ mental state utterances correlated with subsequent theory of mind at all 
three sets of time points. Analogous analyses were carried out for language, after 
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partialing out early mother mental state utterances. Having accounted for all such 
potentially confounding variables, there was clear evidence that both mother 
utterances and language played a unique causal role in facilitating theory of mind. 
Dunn et al.’s (1991a, b) studies are overall methodologically weaker than the studies 
discussed previously. However, it should be noted that Dunn et al.’s studies were 
leading in opening the now vast field of investigation on early parental variables and 
later social cognitive function in children. In Dunn et al. (1991a) the study involved 
41 children at two time points (Time 1: age M = 36 mths., Time 2: age M = 6.5 
yrs.). In Dunn et al. (1991a) the study involved 50 children at two time points much 
closer together (Time 1: age M = 33 mths., Time 2: age M = 40 mths.). Dunn et al. 
(1991a, b) collected their data in home-based observations, without an explicit task 
being given. The authors developed a categorization system for the analysis of 
conversations in which family members referred to feeling states. The analysis was 
limited to feeling state references, and therefore internal state terms regarding 
volition, motivation or cognition were not included. This is a major difference to any 
of the previously discussed studies. In their earlier study (Dunn et al., 1991a), 
children's ability to identify others' emotions was assessed with the Rothenberg 
(1970) test of social sensitivity at Time 2. This test requires children to listen to 
tape-recorded scenarios, in which a character is depicted undergoing a change in 
feelings (e.g. feeling happy at the start of scenario, and scared at the end), and point 
to the correct emotion on photos depicting a range of emotions. It should be noted 
that this test was not used by any of the other studies included in this review. No 
reliability data is reported for this test, making it overall difficult to assess the 
quality of this measure, and its usefulness in measuring ToM performance. Partial 
correlations (controlling for child MLU) were calculated and revealed significant 
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results for feeling state talk from mother to child and subsequent emotion-
recognition task. The same was true when controlling for total mother-child talk. 
In their later study Dunn et al. (1991b) used the same coding system for feeling state 
references. This study focused on younger children (Time 1: M = 33 mths; Time 2:  
M = 40 mths) and used a different set of tasks to evaluate ToM related performance. 
Firstly a false belief task (Bartsch & Wellman, 1989) and an affective perspective-
taking task (Denham, 1986) were used. The latter task involved several vignettes 
centred on emotion-inducing situations that were acted out with hand puppets. The 
task was designed to require inference about a puppet, who was expressing an 
emotion different from the emotion typical for the child in that situation (as 
established from previous interview with mothers, who were asked to indicate 
whether their child would be e.g. happy or sad to come to nursery, whether they 
would be happy about or fearful of big dogs). After each vignette children were 
asked what the puppet was feeling. Correlation analyses revealed significant relation 
between mother-child feeling state talk at Time 1 and both social understanding 
measures used at Time 2. Multivariate regressions were calculated, but will not be 
reported her as they unfortunately did not focus on the specific question this review 
is concerned with. 
Overall, the results from these studies indicate that parental MSL has an influence 
on later ToM performance. However, the studies included in this review proved to 
be very heterogeneous with respect to timing of data collection, coding systems used 
for MSL, and tasks used to measure ToM performance in children. The study by 
Meins et al. (2002) collected data at the earliest Time 1 point of all studies (6 mths), 
where children had no productive, and most likely also no receptive language skills. 
Together with Symons et al.’s (2006) study, which overlaps considerably in the 
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choice of coding system used for MSL and tasks used to measure ToM, this allows 
an overview of development of the relationship between parental MSL and ToM 
between 6 and 69 months. The studies by Meins et al. (2002) and Symons et al. 
(2006) both focused on appropriate MSL, which forms a sub-set of all MSL and 
limits how comparable the results between these studies and others are. Finally, the 
type of tasks used to measure ToM spanned from emotion recognition tasks 
(Taumoepeau et al., 2006, 2008), to false belief tasks most commonly thought of in 
relation to ToM function (Dunn et al., 1991b; Meins et al., 2002; Ruffman et al., 
2002; Symons et al., 2006) and a somewhat less widely used affective perspective 
taking task (Dunn et al., 1991a). This variety can either be interpreted as making the 
evidence for a relationship between parental MSL and ToM stronger. It can however 
also be seen a barrier to comparing the results. 
Methodological issues 
In the following a number of methodological issues shall be outlined that are 
relevant in relation to the research papers that have been included in this review. 
 Interdependence of measures: All studies included in this review that measure 
MSL for parent and child at Time 1 do so within the same session (i.e. picture 
describing task used by Ruffman et al., 2002). Consequently, the measure of MSL 
for parent and child are not independent. This might be problematic, as it precludes 
interpretation of individual differences as that of the particular test session, dyad, or 
person. This is a fundamental interdependence of maternal and child language 
measures. This problem could be overcome by measuring parental use of MSL, e.g. 
with the help of a picture describing task, and then measure the child’s use of MSL 
in an independent situation with another adult or a peer. That in itself is theoretically 
interesting. 
Developmental Pathways of Paranoid Thinking 
 33 
 Frequency or proportion measures: Measuring use of MSL of parents as well 
as children is potentially confounded with the overall amount of verbal output 
produced by a person. Adults or children that are more verbose might for this reason 
produce more mental state utterances. For example, Jenkins et al. (2003) found that 
raw counts of children's mental state talk were correlated with conversation turns for all 
family members, and that raw counts of children’s MSL were correlated with raw 
counts of their mothers' and fathers' MSL. However, when Jenkins et al. (2003) 
controlled for the number of conversation turns many of these relationships were no 
longer significant. This highlights how parents and children showed similarity in their 
use of MSL in the raw data simply because they showed similarity in the amount that 
they talked. 
To control for this, researchers have used various methods. Meins et al. (2002) 
calculated scores for mind-related comments as proportion of the total number of 
comments produced in the play session between parent and infant. They chose not to 
calculate this score relative to all mind-related comments, arguing that this allows a 
truer picture of the frequency with which mothers make appropriate and 
inappropriate mind-related comments during the test session. Symons et al. (2006) 
and Ruffman et al. (2002) on the other hand used frequency scores, as opposed to 
proportion scores. They argue that each word used by parents may have a direct 
impact on the child’s ToM development, and that a proportional representation 
would not capture this as well. The increased use of mental state terms by parents 
could also affect ToM abilities regardless of whether or not it is simply a function of 
the verbosity of parents. Therefore Symons et al. (2006) recorded the mother’s total 
number of words as well, to address parental verbosity. In this review two studies 
included the number of mental state utterances (Ruffman et al., 2002; Symons et al., 
2006) and controlling for verbosity separately, four studies used proportion scores 
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(Rudek et al., 2005; Jenkins et al., 2003; Meins et al., 2002; Taumoepeau et al., 
2006, 2008), and two (Dunn et al., 1991a, b) use a different metric entirely (rate per 
hour). Overall, whether researchers choose either way of measuring MSL may be 
critical when trying to compare outcomes from various studies. Were there 
differences in the outcomes observed in these studies? 
 Inclusion of I know and I don’t know: Studies included in this review differed 
as to whether utterances such as “I know” or “I don’t know” were included in the 
coding for mental state utterances. Ruffman et al. (2002) only included such 
utterances if they referred to a lack of knowledge (e.g. “I don’t know what that is.”) 
or questioned a source of knowledge (e.g. “How do you know that?”). The response 
“I don’t know” was not coded as a mental state utterance if there was no elaboration 
as to what is unknown, making unclear whether the utterance simply is meant as “I 
can’t answer”. Jenkins et al. (2003) and Taumoepeau et al. (2006, 2008) handled this 
issue of coding in a similar way. Meins et al. (2002) did not specifically mention 
“know/don’t know” utterances, possibly as they did not occur in conversations 
mothers were having with their only 6-month-old infants, and did not exclude these. 
Symons et al. (2006) on the other hand excluded all “I don’t know” utterances. 
Rudek et al. (2005) interestingly formed a separate formulaic category into which “I 
don’t know” utterances were included, and all subsequent analyses only included 
nonformulaic mental state utterances. It is therefore a possibility that this difference 
in coding utterances contributes to Rudek et al.’s (2005) study being the only one 
that in this review does not reveal a positive correlation of parental and subsequent 
child’s use of MSL. As Rudek et al. (2005) however also used a very different task 
to measure MSL (reminiscing task) it is unclear whether either of these two factors 
may have led to the lack in findings. 
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 Tasks used to measure ToM ability: The range of tasks used across the studies 
included in this review, which aim to measure ToM ability, is large.  Dunn et al. 
(1991a) for example used a no longer widely utilised Rothenberg (1970) test of 
social sensitivity. This test requires children to listen to tape-recorded scenarios and 
point to the correct emotion on photos depicting a range of emotions. Dunn et al. 
(1991b) used an affective perspective-taking task (Denham, 1986), which involves 
vignettes being acted out with hand puppets. Children are required to make 
inference about a puppet. In other studies false-belief tasks were utilised, which are 
qualitatively very different from the above tasks. Amongst the group of false belief 
tasks, the Appearance Reality (Flavell et al., 1983), Deceptive Box (Hogrefe et al., 
1986), and Unexpected Transfer task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; more commonly 
referred to as Sally-Anne task, Leslie & Frith, 1988), which have been described in 
more detail in the above body of text. Taumoepeau et al. (2006, 2008) on the other 
hand have used emotion recognition tasks as primary indicator for ToM ability.  
It has been highlighted how the development of ToM includes understanding 
multiple concepts acquired in an extended series of developmental accomplishments 
(Wellman, 2002), and has led some researchers to develop a scale of ToM tasks 
(Wellman & Liu, 2004). This calls into question whether the measures of ToM 
utilised in the different studies included in this review are comparable, and 
inevitably makes comparison of results between studies difficult. 
 Unidirectional effect of maternal MSL and child ToM performance: Even with 
longitudinal designs, one has to be very cautious in inferring causality (from 
parental use of MSL to subsequent child ToM ability). For instance Dunn et al. 
(1991a, b) used a single measure at Time 1 (e.g. mother’s frequency in using feeling 
state terms) and a single measure of child ToM at Time 2. There are two reasons 
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why it is difficult to infer a true causal role for mother MSL from such data. First, it 
is possible that mother MSL at Time 1 predict ToM performance at Time 2 
indirectly, through variance they share with ToM understanding at Time 1. That is, 
ToM at Time 1 would be expected to correlate with ToM at Time 2. If mother use of 
MSL and child’s ToM at Time 1 correlate with one another, then early mother MSL 
might correlate with later ToM simply through the shared variance with early ToM, 
and not because they have a unique causal role in facilitating ToM. In order to avoid 
this, early ToM (Time 1) ability in children has to be controlled for in order to be 
able to draw more firm causal conclusions. Those studies that do this (Ruffman et 
al., 2002; Taumoepeau et al., 2006, 2008) find that parental use of MSL has 
predictive value towards subsequent ToM in children. 
Similarly, children’s early social cognitive ability may shape parents’ early use of 
MSL. It is uncertain, whether parental use of MSL towards children at Time 1 
facilitates subsequent ToM, or whether parents used more MSL with their children 
at Time 1 because they had picked up on their children’s higher social cognitive 
ability (evidenced through advanced child mental state talk). For the above reasons 
it is essential to partial out early ToM ability and children’s early MSL when 
considering whether early parental MSL use facilitates later ToM ability. The only 
study that attempts this is that by Taumoepeau et al. (2006, 2008). However, it 
should be noted that MSL is rated by parents. This leaves open the possibility that 
parents who assume their child to have higher ToM ability also choose more MSL 
options on the check-list used to measure MSL. Also, the ToM tasks employed by 
Taumoepeau et al. (2006, 2008) are emotion recognition tasks, and not false belief 
tasks that more commonly are understood to be good measures of ToM ability. 
The studies included in this review which did control for early MSL and/or ToM 
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were those by Ruffman et al. (2002), Jenkins et al. (2003), Rudek et al. (2005), 
Symons et al. 2006) and Taumoepeau et al. (2006, 2008), and are therefore more 
likely to allow links between parental use of MSL to be interpreted as causal. 
 Age and developmental trajectories: The majority of research into the 
relationship between parental and child MSL has been on children 3 – 5 years old. 
Only two of the studies included in this review include data with the first time point 
lying before the children’s first birthday (Dunn et al., 1991b; Meins et al., 2002). 
The remaining studies (see Table 2) have first time points between children’s first 
and third birthday. As for second time points (subsequent child MSL or ToM), the 
range is even greater (between 2 and 6 years). The majority of studies have the 
second data point between the third and fourth birthday, with only three of the 
included studies measuring MSL or ToM after the 5
th
 birthday (Dunn et al., 1991a; 
Meins et al., 2002; Symons et al., 2006). The reason time of testing and age are an 
important issue is that the period of language development before age 2 is fertile 
growing ground to a vast amount of general vocabulary and conversational 
knowledge. With regard to ToM the claim has been made that there is an early onset 
(between 9 and 18 months) of aspects contributing to ToM, such as understanding 
goals, intentions and desires (e. g. Meltzoff, 1995). Jenkins et al. (2003) found that 
family talk was not associated with change in older children’s MSL. This may 
indicate that the factor of exposure to MSL is important to the development of 
mental state talk when children are between 2 and 4 years old, but after that MSL is 
influenced by more intrinsic factors, such as their individual developmental 
trajectory. The large variation in time points of testing across the studies therefore 
does not allow drawing firmer conclusions on what the critical periods, where 
parental MSL may have a beneficial effect on the development of children’s social 
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cognitive function, may be. 
 Language development: In this review the social environment and their effect 
on the social cognitive development of children is of primary interest. However, the 
role of endogenous factors related to a child’s own general language have to be 
taken into account. Biological maturity is the basis for the development of linguistic 
structures that become increasingly sophisticated over development. It is possible 
that parents’ and children’s talk about mental states may correlate with one another 
through mechanisms other than exposure to MSL. It could be genetically mediated 
language processes that account for an association between child and parent mental 
state talk. Therefore it is important that studies control for children’s language 
ability as a proxy for the level of language development that they have reached. The 
mean length of utterances (MLU) and use of MSL at Time 1, as an estimate measure 
for endogenous factors related to individual differences in cognitive functioning, has 
therefore been included in some studies, in order to isolate effects of exposure to 
MSL from other mechanisms in children’s MSL acquisition (e.g. Ruffman et al., 
2002). However, although MLU measure linguistic production, it does not directly 
measure linguistic understanding. It may be important to control for language ability 
using standardised language tests (e.g. Meins et al., 2002). 
 The absence of fathers: The majority of research reported in this review 
focuses on mothers and their children. Only two of the studies that are part of this 
review included fathers (Jenkins et al., 2003; Taumoepeau et al., 2006, 2008). 
Jenkins et al. (2003) measured mental state utterances in two contexts: mother and 
father present with children, or mother alone with children. Interestingly they did 
not add a condition of father alone with children. This does not allow decisive 
conclusions to be drawn concerning gender effects in the use of MSL (mothers were 
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reported to use more MSL than their partners when in company of partner; but it is 
not possible to draw conclusions on fathers using less MSL in general and when on 
their own with children). It further reflects an approach of merely being interested in 
fathers in terms of how they may moderate the mother’s behaviour, rather than 
being of interest in their own right. In the study by Taumoepeau et al. (2006, 2008) 
three fathers were included in the sample. It is therefore surprising that throughout 
the result and discussion section of both papers the authors only ever refer to 
mothers. Again, it does reflect the general bias towards the infant-mother 
relationship. Evidence reveals that at least in families with two parents, children 
whose fathers used more diverse vocabularies had greater language development 
and that mothers' vocabulary did not significantly affect a child's language skills 
(Pancsofar & Vernon-Feagansa, 2006). This highlights that the language 
environment of children is much more diverse, and a focus of research exclusively 
on the mothers is most likely limited. In addition, the composition of family 
members seems to have an effect on the amount of MSL used. Mothers used more 
MSL when they are with their children on their own than when the children’s father 
was present too (Jenkins et al., 2003). It is important to note that Jenkins et al. 
(2003) only recorded mother or father utterances if they were directed towards their 
children. This precludes all MSL that mother and father may be using in 
conversation with each other, which is likely to contribute to the total number of 
MSL that a child encounters, let alone occurring in the context of a child’s first and 
foremost learning opportunity about close relationships (i.e. how their mother and 
father relate to each other, hold each other in mind, etc.). To summarise, the lack of 
studies including fathers is a serious limitation to the research into the contribution 
of MSL used by primary carers on children’s development of MSL and ToM. This 
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however highlights a more general point addressed in the following paragraph. 
 Family factors affecting exposure to MSL: Two studies controlled explicitly 
for family constellation by adding number of older siblings as independent variable 
(e.g. Meins et al., 2002). Other studies (Rudek et al., 2005; Ruffman et al., 2002; 
Taumoepeau et al., 2006, 2008) do not report whether the children in their sample 
had siblings, or they mention proportion of participants that had siblings but do not 
account for it in the analysis (e.g. Symons et al., 2006). As several studies have 
shown that children with relatively more siblings and extended family do better on a 
variety of ToM tasks (e.g. Jenkins & Astington, 1996), the presence or absence of 
siblings in the environment of a child is important. It has been suggested that the 
effect may be restricted to children with older siblings (Ru!man, Perner, Naito, 
Parkin, & Clements, 1998), but evidence is there for older as well as younger 
siblings (Peterson, 2002) to affect false-belief task performance. Overall this 
suggests that the presence of siblings, younger or older, have an effect on the 
development of self and other understanding. However, the specific mechanisms 
have not been studied much. Jenkins et al. (2003) showed that children with older 
siblings are exposed to more talk about cognitive states than children without older 
sibling, possibly indicating why children with older siblings may have higher use of 
MSL a number of years later. This increase in exposure is for one surely the verbal 
output of older siblings per se, but possibly also the increased opportunity younger 
children have listening to their parents interacting with their older siblings, and 
using MSL in that context. However, the inclusion of siblings is by far not an 
adequate description of the (family) environment that exposes a child to MSL. 
Grandparents and extended family as well as non-related alloparents (friends of 
family or, e.g., in formal settings nursery staff) contribute to the world of language 
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that a child encounters. Research not taking into account the wide multitude of 
social learning environments, which can range from a single child being cared for 
mostly by one parent, to that of a child with multiple siblings, cared for by mother 
and father as well as nursery staff and grandparents, is at risk of missing important 
information. 
 Parental socioeconomic status and level of education: Recent research has 
shown beneficial effects of having siblings on the performance on false belief tasks, 
however only for older but not younger siblings (Ruffman et al., 1998). The sibling 
effect was not replicated, however, in two more studies involving working-class 
families (Cole & Mitchell, 2000; Cutting & Dunn, 1999). This highlights how 
socioeconomic status is a variable that is not to be neglected when studying 
socialisation effects on social cognitive functioning. Studies included in this review 
have not all reported measures of socio-economic status (SES) for families 
participating in their studies. Some have simply stated their sample was drawn from 
middle class families without reporting measures (Furrow et al., 1992; Rudek et al., 
2005), or only stated parents’ educational background (Jenkins et al., 2003), without 
including this information in the data analysis. Meins et al. (2002) included mother’s 
level of education as independent variable. Ruffman et al. (2002) explicitly 
measured SES and found this variable to correlate with later ToM understanding in 
children. Symons et al. (2006) also measured SES and found it not to be correlated 
with any of the dependent measures. Use of MSL may be related to the amount of 
time parents have spent in education, as maternal educational level has been found 
to correlate positively with children’s ToM performance (Cutting & Dunn, 1999; 
Meins & Fernyhough, 1999). Taumoepeau et al. (2006, 2008) coded mothers’ 
education level as a measure of SES, and partialed this variable out of subsequent 
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correlation analyses. However, no correlations of SES with any of the dependent 
variables are reported.  
Firstly, the variable inclusion or exclusion of SES across the studies included in this 
review makes drawing conclusions on the generalisability of the results difficult. 
Further, the high proportion of studies that included families from relatively high 
socioeconomic background, leave open whether the results generalise to children 
from families with lower SES. Ruffman et al. (2002) speculate that it is possible that 
mothers of working-class children do not use MSL to the same extent, so that there 
are fewer benefits to be had for their children.  
 Confounding factors: Parents that differ in their use of MSL are likely to also 
differ in other respects, for example in their emotional expressiveness or ability to 
recognise emotions, or their own social cognitive abilities. The study by 
Taumoepeau et al. (2006, 2008) is the only one included in this review that 
measured parental performance on an emotion recognition task and partialed out 
mothers’ performance from correlations of MSL and subsequent child ToM. The 
results revealed that it was what mothers said, their talk about mental states, rather 
than their mental state (emotion recognition task performance) that correlated with 
later child mental state understanding. The authors therefore interpreted their results 
as consistent with recent findings that most of the variance in preschool children’s 
false-belief understanding is determined by environmental rather than genetic 
factors (Hughes, Jaffee, Happe, Taylor, Caspi, & Moffitt, 2005). However, none of 
the other studies have controlled for parental ToM, and therefore it is unclear 
whether it is the shared genetic make-up between parents and children that leads 
children, whose parents use more MSL, to have subsequent higher ToM 
performance. 
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Strengthening the future research 
Some of the ways in which future research on the influence of MSL on the social 
cognitive development in children can be improved follows naturally from the 
methodological issues that have been highlighted above. 
With respect to procedural aspect of future research, there are a number of points to 
be made. Firstly, consistent coding of mental state utterances is required. Authors, 
such as Taumoepeau et al. (2006, 2008) have already done so by making their 
coding comparable to previously published data. This allows for direct comparison 
of results, and is preferable for future research. Apart from the coding convention 
that is being used, the setting and task given, or not given, during the measurement 
of MSL is also important. As has been shown above, the circumstances under which 
parental use of MSL was measures varied considerably between studies. It would be 
preferable for future research to have more consistency in the conditions under 
which MSL is measured. For example, it is possible that giving parents an explicit 
task (e.g. talking about a set of pictures) highlights the difference between those 
parents that use MSL frequently and those that do not. Unfortunately the comparison 
between a study, that provided parents with an explicit task (e.g. Ruffman et al., 
2002) and one that did not (e.g. Jenkins et al., 2003), to see whether they do produce 
greater variability in use of MSL, is not easily possible. This is the case as studies 
differ on the way data are reported (i.e. frequency or proportion measures). Future 
research could be improved by reporting both types of information, in order to allow 
further comparison of past and future research. Finally, measures for parental and 
child use of MSL ideally should be sampled separately, for example during different 
sessions, with different people. This would allow for greater clarity on whether 
variability in use of MSL is due to person characteristics, and not due to dyadic 
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factors. In order to gather further information on the unidirectional effect of 
exposure to MSL on subsequent development of MSL and ToM in children, MSL, 
general language ability and ToM performance at Time 1 has to be controlled for. 
However, apart from these more procedural issues, there are several other factors 
that future research should include, in order to allow clearer conclusions from data. 
These suggestions all fall under the category of increased generalisability. For one, 
the SES of participants included in future research should have a wider range. In 
addition, rather than focusing exclusively on the infant-mother dyad, future research 
would benefit from incorporating a better estimate of a child’s overall exposure to 
MSL. This of course will include not only conversations with their mother, but as 
has been pointed out above and by others (Jenkins et al., 2003) it most likely will 
also include fathers, siblings, grandparents, alloparents, nursery staff. It would 
further be of interest to include the use of MSL in media that a child is exposed to. 
Previously it has been shown that audible television is associated with decreased 
exposure to human adult speech and decreased child vocalizations. These results 
may explain the association between infant television exposure and delayed 
language development (Christakis, Gilkerson, Richards, Zimmerman, Garrison, Xu, 
Gray, & Yapanel, 2009). However, it would be valuable to utilise the methods 
Christakis et al. (2009) used, to investigate a fuller sample of MSL a child is 
exposed to. Children wore a digital recorder in a vest with a chest pocket, held at a 
specific distance from the mouth to captured everything the child said and also heard 
during continuous 12 to 16 hour periods (Christakis et al., 2009). This would allow a 
full sample of all MSL a child is exposed to, in the different environments that a 
child may move in, and with the full range of individuals that a child may be in 
contact with, either direct (i.e. conversation with parent) or indirect (i.e. listening to 
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conversation between parent and sibling, or even characters in a children’s 
program). A further valuable source of data could be found in an approach that only 
recently has become available through the Human Speechome Project (Roy, Patel, 
DeCamp, Kubat, Fleischman, Roy, Mavridis, Tellex, Salata, Guiness, Levit, & 
Gorniak, 2006). Roy et al. (2006) have developed a way of recording vast amounts 
of auditory and visual data for a child from birth. This data could hold valuable 
information on the use of MSL in adults and the emergence of MSL in the child, 
despite the limitation of being a single case study.  
 
Discussion 
This review set out to evaluate if MSL, as a marker of social environment, facilitates 
the development of children’s social cognitive function, represented by their own 
use of MSL or performance on ToM tasks. Overall the review has highlighted a 
number of methodological issues. However, there are some studies (e.g. 
Taumoepeau et al., 2006, 2008; Jenkins et al., 2003) that are methodologically 
rigorous (for example control for confounding factors, such as use of MSL at Time 
1, and estimate of language ability), and reveal a positive relationship between 
parental use of MSL and subsequent MSL and ToM performance in children. 
However, the overall volume of such studies is rather small. It should be noted that 
this is partly due to the restriction of only including truly longitudinal studies, as this 
is the most valuable type of study design when investigating developmental 
questions. Even within this small volume of studies, the age range of participants, 
the variation in measures used to assess ToM ability, and the variability in coding 
MSL is making the empirical evidence rather slim. The conclusions drawn from this 
review have to therefore be cautious. On the other hand, the fact that despite the 
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large variation in studies (measures, time points) there has been a consistent report 
of a positive relationship between parental MSL and subsequent MSL and/or ToM 
performance in children, indicates further research is justified and necessary.  
Social cognitive processes have most likely evolved to facilitate interpersonal 
functioning (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). If MSL therefore contributes to the 
development of social cognitive functioning, it is of interest to consider that 
Ruffman, Slade, Devitt, and Crowe (2006) showed how initial frequencies of 
maternal talk about mental states predicted unique variance in children’s later 
performance in measures of conflict/cooperation with a friend. 
If the use of MSL by parents has a facilitating effect on the use in their children, and 
even their subsequent ToM performance, this of course has clinical implications. 
Efforts to train parents in using a more elaborative reminiscing style, with a focus on 
emotion (Van Bergen, Salmon, Dadds, & Allen, 2009), have been shown to result in 
subsequently higher use of such language in conversations between parents and 
children. These findings highlight that an elaborative and emotion-rich reminiscing 
style can be taught to parents, with potential benefits for children's emotion 
knowledge development. This is interesting to consider together with the by now 
large literature pointing towards pretend play to have an important role in theory of 
mind (e.g. Astington, Harris, & Olson, 1988; for overview see Lillard, 2001). 
Raikes and Thompson (2006) found that, in a longitudinal study of mothers and 2-
year-old toddlers, secure attachment relationships support children’s emotion 
understanding by promoting mother-child discussion of emotion. They found 
emotion understanding (approximately 12 months later) to be directly impaired by 
maternal depression. This has implications when considering intervention that could 
lessen the impact of maternal depression on the development of children. 
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Limitations of this review 
Methodological limitations of the studies included in this review have been outlined 
above. Further, all studies included in this review understood MSL to include words 
and utterances that seem the most obvious mental state terms. However, subtler 
forms of MSL may be relevant. For example, it has been argued that even simple 
words like “look” and “see” uttered during play has implications for mental states, 
because they require an understanding of the partner’s perspective (Carpendale & 
Lewis, 2004). There are further expressions, such as ‘to hide’, that involve 
understanding how people know things, and how one can prevent people from 
knowing things (Turnbull & Carpendale, 1999), which are not included in all coding 
systems for MSL. Of course studying the linguistic environment of a child, and the 
effect on the child’s social cognitive development, becomes very complex when 
widening the investigation to such expressions. However, it is possible that such 
terms or phrases, which in the case of ‘to hide’, are much more action and play 
related, have a substantial impact on the development of understanding of minds. 
Children have been shown to pass the false belief task when using “where would 
Sally look” or “what would Sally say” questions (Chandler & Hala 1994; Nelson, 
Plesa Skwerer, Goldman, Henseler, Presler, & Walkenfeld, 2003) before they can 
pass the test using the “what would Sally think” probe. This further indicates that a 
great deal of talk that is based on an understanding of knowledge acquisition and the 
mental world, and may involve terms what we would usually not consider to be 
mental state terms. 
Conclusions 
Longitudinal research reviewed here indicates that the MSL a child is exposed to has 
an influence on their development of social cognitive function. This review has of 
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course only focused on one of the factors (MSL) that have been proposed to 
influence social cognitive development. Other factors, such as pretend play (Lillard, 
2001), have been proposed and widely investigated.  
A number of methodological issues have been highlighted within this review, which 
means the empirical evidence to support MSL influencing social cognitive function 
is still in its infant shoes. However, with the advancement of new ways of collecting 
longitudinal data for children, that capture better their total exposure to MSL, future 
research may change this. Further, research investigating the effect of training (e. g. 
encouraging more use of MSL) on subsequent social and social cognitive 
functioning may complement this endeavour. 
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Table and Figure Captions 
Table 1. Quality Rating Scale. 
Table 2. Summary of Reviewed Papers. 
Figure 1. Flow chart of Search Strategy and Results. 
Figure 2. Overview of Duration of Studies Included (Time 1 to Time 2 or 3), 
Investigating MSL in children. 
Figure 3. Overview of duration of studies included (Time 1 to Time 2 or 3), 
Investigating ToM in children. 
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Objectives  
1. Are the aims/question/hypotheses clearly stated or described?  
Sampling 
2. Baseline demographic & characteristics of the group are specified to allow 
appropriate comparisons (e.g. SES, education status of parents) 
3. Type of sample group: 
Geographic cohort, convenience, highly selective; Geographic cohort; 
Convenience; Highly selective 
4. How many participants are included in the study? Is the sample size based 
on adequate power calculations? 
5. Was a well matched control group employed or in the absence of a control 
group were attempts to control for confounding variables in design? 
Design 
6. Is the study design appropriate to test the hypotheses? 
7. Were confounders accounted for in the study design? Baseline ability e.g. 
use of mental state language at T1, language ability, maternal sensitivity 
Assessment 
8. Are standardised assessments used to measure parental use of mental state 
language in a standard way? This includes clear description of coding 
system used, with e.g. reference to previous studies and the convention 
used). 
9.
  
Are standardised assessments used to measure children’s use of a) mental 
state language or b) false belief task performance in a standard way? 
10. Reliable measure used and reliability co-efficients given? 
Analysis 
11. The analysis is appropriate to aims, design and type of outcome measure. 
12. The study clearly indicates how many people asked to take part did so, and 
percentage of those who dropped out before completion. 
13. Is there adequate reporting of summary statistics? 
14. Have effect sizes (incl. correlations) and confidence intervals been reporte
  
Results and Discussion 
15. Do the findings relate to the aims/questions/hypotheses  
16. Are recommendations for clinical practice/ future research discussed in 
relation to the findings? 
17. Are limitations of the study clearly expressed? 
Note: Raters chose from the following options: Adequate; Partial; Inadequate; Not 
Applicable. Each study was given a percentage score based on the number of items 
achieved, and items not applicable to the design of the study were not scored or included in 
the percentage calculation. 
 
 
Developmental Pathways of Paranoid Thinking 
 60 
 
Study Participants Measurement 
of parental 
variables 
Dependent 
Variable 
Results Methodological Issues or 
Comment 
Dunn et al. 
(1991a) 
N = 41 (21 
girls), age at 
T1: 36 mths., 
at T2: 6.5 yrs. 
Home-based 
observation, no 
task. 
Affective 
Perspective 
Taking: 
Rothenberg Test 
of Social 
Sensitivity. 
Children growing up in families 
frequently engaging in feeling-state 
talk, were better at age 6 in making 
judgments about the emotions in 
affective perspective-taking task. 
Mother-child feeling-state turns 
correlated with Rothenberg scores: 
r(40) = .40; controlling for child’s 
MLU: r(40) = .38; controlling for 
total mother-child talk: r(40) = .35 
(all significant at p < .05). 
Affective Perspective taking tasks not 
widely used.  
Analysis limited to feeling state 
references (different from MSL coding 
in other studies). 
Dunn et al. 
(1991b) 
N = 50 (27 
girls), 
age at T1: 33 
mths.,  
At T2: 40 
mths. 
Home-based 
observation, no 
task. 
Performance on 
False-belief 
task. 
Mother’s feeling talk is correlated 
with false belief task performance. 
Analysis limited to feeling state 
references (different from MSL coding 
in other studies). 
Furrow et al. 
(1992) 
N = 19 (12 
girls), age at 
T1: 2 yrs.,  
At T2: 3 yrs. 
Home-based 
observation 
(lunch time, 
story reading, 
joint play 
session), no 
specific  task 
given. 
Use of Mental 
state terms. 
Mothers use of MSL when child 2 
predicted the child’s use at 3  
(r = .50). 
Correlation analysis did not control for 
child’s level of MSL at T1. No analysis 
to control bidirectional nature of 
correlations. 
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Meins et al. 
(2002) 
N = 57 (28 
girls), 
age at T1: M 
= 6 mths,. 
at T2: M = 45 
mths., at T3: 
M = 48 mths. 
20 min free 
play session in 
lab. No specific 
instruction 
given. 
ToM tasks;  T2: 
Appearance 
reality task, and  
Deceptive box 
task. 
T3: unexpected 
transfer task. 
Children of mothers that make more 
appropriate mental state comments 
when they are 6 mths old, perform 
better on ToM tasks aged 45 and 
48 mths. (r = .34, p < .05).   
No data reported on total MSL used 
by mothers. Data only presented for 
appropriate and inappropriate mental 
state comments. 
Ruffman et al. 
(2002) 
T1: N = 82 
(41 girls), age 
M = 3.01 yrs, 
T2: N = 79 
(40 girls), age 
M = 3.41 yrs, 
T3: N = 72 
(36 girls), age 
M = 4.04 yrs. 
Mothers asked 
to talk about 
series of 10 
pictures with 
their child. 
Mental state 
utterances, ToM 
performance. 
Partial correlations between mother 
MSL and later child MSL (Time 1-2: 
r = .41, Time 1-3: r = .51, Time 2-3: 
r = .39; taking into account child 
MSL at Time 1).  
Mothers’ MSL predicted later ToM 
(partialing out early ToM, MSL, 
language, and maternal 
education/SES), at all three time 
points. 
In contrast to previous research, 
authors control for MSL at Time 1 and 
language ability. Mothers level of MSL 
predicted ToM better than language 
ability. 
Jenkins et al. 
(2003) 
N = 37, T1 
age M = 2.4 
yrs, T2: M = 
4.4 yrs. Ages 
stated are for 
younger 
siblings.  
Home-based 
observation, no 
task. 
Mental state 
utterances. 
Regression analyses: cog. and 
feeling talk by family members at T1 
predicted change in younger 
children's cog. and feeling talk  
(respectively) at T2 (controlling  
for initial MSL and general language 
ability). 
Did not report results across all types 
of MSL which does not allow an 
evaluation whether overall family 
members’ MSL has an effect on 
childrens’ MSL. 
Rudek et al. 
(2005) 
N = 21 (11 
girls), T1 age 
M = 30 mths., 
T2: M = 42.4 
mths. 
Dyads asked to 
discuss several 
previously  
experienced 
events. 
Mental state 
utterances. 
Mothers’ and children’s early use 
better predicted their own later use 
of mental terms than did the early 
mental term use of their partner. So 
in this study there is no evidence for 
the mother’s use of mental terms 
predicting the later use of such 
terms by the child. 
Unclear whether specific memory-
related conversation is determining 
factor. 
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Symons et al. 
(2006) 
N = 43 (20 
girls), T1 age 
M = 24.7 
mths., T2: M 
= 69.2 mths. 
Mothers asked 
to play with 
toddlers in lab 
(10 min. video 
taped). 
ToM tasks: 
unexpected 
identity and 
contents task, 
changed 
location  
Tasks. 
ToM was positively associated with 
the mother ’s appropriate desire 
state language, but not her  
appropriate cognitive state 
language. 
No measure of child language at T2, 
in order to control for this potentially 
confounding variable.  
Taumoepeau et 
al. (2006) 
N = 74 (33 
girls), T1 age 
M = 14.8 
mths., T2: M 
= 24.2 mths. 
Mothers asked 
to engage child 
in picture-
describing task 
in lab. Pictures 
of people and 
children 
expressing a 
rang of 
emotions. 
MSL use as 
rated by mother, 
two emotion 
recognition 
tasks. 
T1 mother desire terms correlated 
with all three categories of child 
mental state language (emotion, 
desire, total MSL) at T2 as well as 
the emotion situation task. No other 
type of mother MSL correlated with 
later child language or emotion task 
performance.  
 
 
In this study mental state utterances 
by children were not rated from actual 
performance in picture describing task 
(as for maternal level of MSL) but by 
asking mothers to rate their child no a 
words and gestures checklist (T1: 
what child understood and/or 
produced, T2: only words that child 
produced). This adds a potential error 
to this variable. 
Taumoepeau et 
al. (2008) 
Same sample 
as 
Taumoepeau 
et al. (2006), 
added T3, 
age M = 32.8 
mths., N = 
72. 
Same sample 
as 
Taumoepeau et 
al. (2006), 
added T3. 
At T3 MSL use 
as rated by 
mother, 
shortened 
emotion 
recognition task. 
Mothers’ reference to others’ 
thoughts and knowledge at T2 was 
the most consistent  
predictor of children’s MSL at T3. 
Only mothers think/know talk at T2 
correlated with child’s performance 
on emotion task at T3. 
As above, MSL for children was 
based on self-report measure by 
mother, which might add a potential 
error to this variable. 
Note: MLU – mean length of utterance. MSL – mental state language. 
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Search terms entered into electronic databases: MEDLINE, PsycINFO, 
ERIC, HMIC, MWIC, EMBASE, Social Policy and Practice 
63 references identified for 
filtering using 
inclusion/exclusion criteria 
Hand search of key 
paper reference lists 
10 references pass on 
inclusion/exclusion 
criteria. 
14 duplications 39 fail on 
inclusion/exclusion  
criteria 
53 
excluded 
10 studies included in 
review 
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Furrow et al. (1992) 
Ruffman et al. (2002) 
Jenkins et al. (2003) 
Rudek et al. (2005) 
Taumopeau et al. (2006, 2008) 
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Ruffman et al. (2002) 
Taumopeau et al. (2006, 2008) 
Dunn et al. (1991b) 
Meins et al. (2002) 
Symons et al. (2006) 
Dunn et al. (1991a)
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Abstract 
Introduction: Recent evidence points to a continuum of paranoid thinking in the 
normal population. Some studies have proposed direct relationships between trauma 
and paranoia, and others have suggested that attachment theory may be useful in 
mapping pathways from early life experience to paranoia. Most of these studies 
have highlighted broad ‘cognitive’ mechanisms. However, attachment theory 
highlights the consequences of early childhood experience with a primary caregiver 
for affect regulation and mentalising. Methods: A total of 722 participants (all 
University students, 456/266 women/men, median age = 23 years) took part in an 
online questionnaire-based study. Participants completed measures of paranoia, 
early life experience, attachment anxiety/avoidance, positive and negative affect, 
empathy and social comparison. Results: Regression analyses highlighted a role of 
early life experience, affect and empathy in predicting paranoia. Structural Equation 
Modeling revealed a more complex double mediation between early life experience 
and paranoia. Attachment anxiety/avoidance only had a strong predictive effect for 
paranoia when taking positive and negative affect into account. Empathy was shown 
to mediate the relationship between early life experience and paranoia. Conclusions: 
The results highlight possible developmental pathways to paranoia. Both 
developmental pathways implicating affect regulation and mentalisation are relevant 
to paranoia in a non-clinical sample. 
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Introduction 
Persecutory delusion (also referred to as paranoia) is characterised by the belief that 
one is at risk of harm, coupled with the belief that a persecutor has the intention to 
cause harm (Freeman & Garety, 2000). This emphasis on intentionality is important 
for the distinction between paranoia and anxiety. 
The content of persecutory thoughts, in terms of type and timing of threat, the 
target of the harm, and the identity and intention of the persecutor, can vary greatly 
(Freeman, Garety, & Kuipers, 2001). Many have argued that paranoia might be 
better understood as lying on a continuum of severity in the general population (e.g. 
van Os & Verdoux, 2003). At one end there are persecutory delusions seen in 
psychotic disorders, and along the continuum lie non-clinical paranoid experiences 
(or paranoid thinking). Non-clinical and clinical paranoid experiences have been 
associated with the same risk factors (Freeman, 2007; Myin-Germeys, Krabbendam, 
&van Os, 2003), and non-clinical paranoia experiences increase the likelihood of 
subsequent diagnosis of psychotic disorder (Poulton et al., 2000). This suggests that 
studying paranoid thinking may inform our understanding of more clinically severe 
paranoia. 
Paranoid beliefs are held by 10-15% of the general population, according to a 
conservative estimate by Freeman (2007), and even subtypes of paranoia have been 
identified in a non-clinical sample (Combs et al., 2007). This is in tune with the 
position that psychosis (and psychotic experiences) can be seen as part of the 
mainstream developmental psychology (Bentall, Fernyhough, Morrison, Lewis, & 
Corcoran, 2007). After a long dominant position of neuro-cognitive models of 
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psychosis, which tended not take developmental theories of interpersonal 
functioning and affect regulation into account, emotional-interpersonal pathways, 
that may play a role in psychosis, have been highlighted in more recent years (e.g. 
emotion regulation important for understanding development and course of 
psychosis: Gumley, White, & Power, 1999; Gumley & Schwannauer, 2006). 
Aspects of attachment theory have stimulated thinking and research into 
developmental routes to psychotic experiences. Early attachment experiences with a 
primary caregiver, Bowlby proposed, become internalised and are the foundation of 
core relational schemata of ourselves in relation to others (Bowlby, 1973). These 
attachment styles are internal working models (Bretherton & Munholland, 1999) of 
the self in relation to others that, once formed early in childhood, guide perception 
and behaviour in adulthood (Bowlby, 1988). In paranoia, when others are viewed as 
threatening and negative, this is hypothesised to reflect internal working models that 
involve representations of others as threatening. Links between attachment style and 
psychosis have been demonstrated (e. g. Dozier, Stovall, & Albus, 1999; see Berry, 
Barrowclough & Wearden (2007) for a review of the role of adult attachment style in 
psychosis), however, the research is still limited. However, it has been noted that no 
unique developmental pathways have been mapped out for psychosis (Liotti & 
Gumley, 2008). 
Direct effects of trauma have been suggested, which view paranoia as an 
understandable response to trauma. A number clinical and non-clinical studies have 
found an association of trauma and psychotic symptoms (e.g. Bebbington et al., 
2004; Read, van Os, Morrison, & Ross, 2005), with a history of trauma having been 
shown to add a 10-fold increase in risk to develop psychotic symptomatology 
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(Janssen et al., 2004). There have been several theoretical attempts at explaining 
how trauma may increase the likelihood of delusions and hallucinations (e.g. 
Morrison, Frame, & Larkin, 2003; Fowler et al., 2006; Read, Agar, Argyle, & 
Aderhold, 2003). With regard to paranoia, a history of trauma has been shown to be 
significantly associated with both persecutory ideation and hallucinations in an 
analogue sample (Freeman & Fowler, 2009). Trauma has been speculated to have an 
impact on persecutory thinking via anxiety (Freeman & Garety, 1999; Freeman et 
al., 2009). 
As part of a cognitive approach it has been suggested that attachment history shapes 
attitudes and interpersonal schemata, in form of models of self and other. These lead 
persons to differ on two dimensions, that of attachment anxiety and attachment 
avoidance. Attachment anxiety is associated with a negative self-image, an 
excessive need for approval from others, together with a fear of rejection and 
abandonment. Attachment avoidance is associated with a negative image of others 
and is defined in terms of either an excessive need for self-reliance or a fear of 
depending on others. In a non-clinical sample, it has been shown that anxiety in 
attachment relationships were correlated with non-clinical psychotic phenomena 
(Berry, Wearden, Barrowclough & Liversidge, 2006), and even after controlling for 
negative affect, a significant relationship was observed between attachment anxiety 
and paranoia. 
However, it has been highlighted how the self-report measures assessing attachment 
style are less robust. They have a severe limitation as they rely on self-report, when 
individuals may not be able to consciously access underlying attachment processes 
(Crowell, Fraley & Shaver, 1999). The Adult Attachment Interview (Main & 
Goldwyn, 1998), by means of discourse analysis, tries to access underlying 
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attachment processes. This narrative paradigm has been highlighted to tap into 
adults’ non-conscious processes for regulating emotion during discussion of 
attachment related experiences during childhood (Jacobvitz, Curran & Moller, 
2002). This tool allows further measuring of a person’s reflective functioning, now 
commonly termed mentalising (Allen & Fonagy, 2006). Mentalising refers to the 
ability to reflect on one’s own and others’ mental states, and is a developmentally 
acquired skill (Fonagy & Target, 2002) that develops in a social context of an infant 
with a caregiver. Building on the above, a developmental affect regulation route 
forms an important extension to cognitive models of psychotic experiences, and 
paranoia in particular. Robust evidence has now emerged to show that mentalisation 
is impaired among persons with a diagnosis of schizophrenia compared to non-
patient controls (Sprong, Schothorst, Vos, Hox, & van Engeland, 2007). Deficits in 
the development of mentalisation are proposed to emerge in early attachment 
experiences. It has been suggested that a likely consequence of early attachment 
disorganisation is a deficit in mentalising (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004; Fonagy et al., 
2004). A deficit in mentalising limits the ability to affect-regulate in both personal 
and interpersonal domains. Further, the ability to reconsider (internal or external) 
experiences and seek other peoples’ opinions may be limited. Not only may 
mentalisation deficits impact on a person’s ability to evaluate other people’s actions. 
It has been proposed that mentalisation deficits further impacts on a person’s ability 
to reflect about themselves. This makes it more likely for underlying negative 
interpersonal schemata, related to interpersonal trauma, to remain unprocessed, 
compartmentalized and fragmented, and thus emerge in the contents of psychotic 
experiences (Liotti & Gumley, 2008).  
To sum up, a person’s attachment history impacts on their ability to mentalise 
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(Bateman & Fonagy, 2004) and affect regulate (e. g. Conklin, Bradley and Westen, 
2006). Both processes are likely to impact on the development and maintenance of 
paranoia. This study seeks to investigate the link between early life experiences with 
paranoia, in a non-clinical sample of University students. More specifically, it seeks 
to highlight the pathway between early childhood experience and attachment style 
as well as ability to reflect about the mental states of others. Structural equation 
modeling will be used to test direct effects of early life experience with paranoid 
thinking, cognitive effects of attachment style (in terms of attitudes about self and 
others) as well as developmental effects of emotion regulation. 
 
Method 
Participants 
All participants were students at the University of Glasgow. A total of 886 people 
started completing the online study, of which 726 (82%) completed the entire set of 
research questions. Following this, four participants were excluded as data screening 
revealed a pattern of response repetition on one or more of the self-report measures. 
This led to a total sample of 722 participants (456 women, 266 men). The age range 
was 16 to 62 years (mean = 25.48 years, SD = 7.37 years, median = 23 years, 
interquartile range = 7 years). The majority of participants described themselves as 
“white British” (73%), or “white other” (14%). The remaining participants (13%) 
described themselves to belong to other ethnic groups, and the majority was “Asian 
or Asian British – Indian” or “Chinese”. Nearly all participants (98%) chose to enter 
the prize draw to win an ipod nano™. 
Procedure 
All students (undergraduate and post-graduate level) of six (out of the total of nine) 
Developmental Pathways of Paranoid Thinking 
 73 
Faculties of the University were contacted by email and invited to take part in a 
research study. Students willing to take part could click a link embedded in the 
email, which directed them to the online study. The study was hosted by a web-
based survey tool (www.surveymonkey.com). Participants gave informed consent 
before being asked for some demographic information. Thereafter participants 
completed the self-report measures in the following order: The International Positive 
and Negative Affect Schedule, short-form (Thompson, 2007), Psychosis Attachment 
Measure (Berry et al., 2006), Empathy Quotient (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 
2004), Paranoia Scales (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992), The Early Life Experiences 
Scale (Gilbert, Cheung, Grandfield, Campey & Irons, 2003) and Social Comparison 
Scale (Allan & Gilbert, 1995). After completing the self-report measures, 
participants had the opportunity to enter the prize draw, which had been mentioned 
in the initial contact email. Email addresses were stored separately from responses 
on self-report measures to ensure anonymity. Ethical permission was obtained from 
the Faculty of Medicine Research Ethics Committee, University of Glasgow. 
Measures 
All measures were inspected for item or response frequency problems. None of the 
measures were found to have item or response frequencies above 74% of the total 
sample. The data for all measures were tested for suitability for factor analytic 
modeling (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity). Data from all measures were found to be suitable. A maximum 
likelihood factor analytic model was chosen for all factor analyses described in the 
following section. An oblique rotation technique (oblimin) of items was chosen, as 
for all measures it had to be assumed that factors are correlated. 
 Paranoia Scale (PS): The PS  (Fenigstein et al., 1992) was designed to 
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measure the incidence of paranoia in a college population. The scale consists of 20 
items, measuring paranoid experience (e.g., ‘I sometimes feel as if I am being 
followed’) and paranoid beliefs (e.g., ‘It is safe to trust no-one’). Items are answered 
on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (not at all applicable to me) to 5 (extremely 
applicable to me). Responses are summed to produce a score, which ranges from 20 
to 100; higher scores reflect higher levels of subclinical paranoia. The scale has high 
internal consistency, with Cronbach’s alpha of 0.91. This is somewhat higher than 
the Cronbach’s alpha reported by Fenigstein et al.  (1992). Every item loaded 
positively on the first factor derived from a maximum likelihood factor analysis with 
subsequent oblique rotation (oblimin). This factor explained 39.7% of the total 
variance of the scale, whereas the second factor only explained 6.2%. These results 
are consistent with the general factor solution reported by Fenigstein et al. (1992). 
The subsequent analyses used a single score for the PS. See Appendix B for items of 
the PS. 
 Psychosis Attachment Measure (PAM): This 16-item measure by Berry et al. 
(2006) was based on existing measures of attachment (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 
1991; Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998) and validated with a large analogue sample. 
Participants are asked to rate the extent to which each item is characteristic of them 
using a four-point Likert scale (1 = ‘not at all’ to 4 = ‘very much’; see Appendix for 
items). A revised version of the measure, based on Berry et al.’s (2006) paper 
(personal communication with Katherine Berry, Oct. 2009), was used in this study. 
Anxiety and avoidance subscale scores were derived by averaging scores for the 8 
anxiety and 8 avoidance items. See Appendix D for items of the PAM. A maximum 
factor analysis with subsequent oblique rotation (oblimin) was performed. Three 
factors had Eigenvalues above one, and inspection of the scree plot also suggested a 
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factor structure of three. The first factor, representing attachment avoidance, 
accounted for 26.6% of the variance. The items loading on this factor fully 
replicated the results reported by Berry et al. (2006). The second factor accounted 
for 19.9% of the variance and the third factor explained 6.4% of additional variance. 
The second and third factor loaded on all other items that in Berry et al. (2006) 
contributed to the attachment anxiety subscale. Items loading on the second factor 
(‘I worry that if other people get to know me better, they won’t like me’, ‘I worry a 
lot about my relationships with other people’, ‘I worry that if I displease other 
people, they won’t want to know me anymore’, ‘I worry about having to cope with 
problems and difficult situations on my own’, ‘I feel uncomfortable when other 
people want to get to know me better’) were related to discomfort with closeness. 
On the other hand, items that loaded on the third factor (‘I tend to get upset, anxious 
or angry if other people are not there when I need them’, ‘I worry that key people in 
my life won’t be around in the future’, ‘I ask other people to reassure me that they 
care about me’, ‘If other people disapprove of something I do, I get very upset’) 
were more related to fear of abandonment. Goodness of fit tests however revealed 
that both two and three factor solutions were poor fit to data (two factor solution 
Chi
2
 = 459; three factor solution Chi
2
 = 301). We therefore chose to utilise the two-
factor solution, to allow comparison with previous research. A score for attachment 
anxiety and attachment avoidance was calculated for each participant respectively. 
The internal consistency of each dimension was high. Cronbach’s alpha for the 
attachment anxiety and avoidance dimension was 0.81 and 0.81 respectively. We 
also note inconsistent reliability for factors in three factor solution (Cronbach’s 
alpha for the anxiety, discomfort with closeness and fear of abandonment dimension 
was .81, .80 and .67 respectively), which may be related to low number of items). 
Developmental Pathways of Paranoid Thinking 
 76 
This highlights a need for further development of the scale. 
The Early Life Experiences Scale (ELES): This scale was developed by 
Gilbert et al. (2003) to measure recall of personal feelings of perceived threat and 
subordination in childhood. This measure presents a departure from traditional 
measures which investigate recall of parental behaviour. The ELES proves high 
correlation with recall of parental behaviour measure (short form of EMBU, 
Swedish acronym for my memories of upbringing; Arrindell et al., 1999), and 
therefore no separate measure was used in this study. The ELES consists of 15 items 
(see Appendix F). Participants were required to rate how true each statement was for 
them in their childhood (1 = completely untrue, 2 = very occasionally true, 3 = 
sometimes true, 4 = fairly true, 5 = very true). A maximum likelihood factor 
analysis with subsequent oblique rotation (oblimin) revealed a three-factor structure, 
explaining 64.4% of the total variance. The pattern of items loading on the three 
factors was identical to that reported by Gilbert et al. (2003). The first factor 
(explaining 48.3% of total variance) relates mostly to perceived threat (e.g. ‘In order 
to avoid getting hurt I used to try to avoid my parents’). The second factor 
(explaining 8.8% of total variance) includes six items that related to submissive 
behaviour, such as, ‘I often had to go along with others even when I did not want to’ 
and ‘I often had to give in to others at home’. A third factor (explaining 7.3% of 
total variance) loads on the three items, ‘feeling equal, feeling relaxed, and able to 
assert self in the family’. These were unnamed by Gilbert and colleagues however it 
was noted that this scale is most closely conceptually linked to behaviour consistent 
with secure attachment and was therefore named Freedom and Autonomy.  
Subsequent reliability analysis of the three subscales revealed a Cronbach alpha of 
0.87 for threat, 0.85 for submissiveness and 0.81 for freedom and autonomy. 
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Cronbach alpha for the total scale was .75, indicating satisfactory consistency. The 
three-factor solution was used in subsequent analyses.  
 Empathy quotient (EQ): The EQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2004) was used to 
assess empathy. The EQ is a self-report questionnaire, containing 40 empathy items 
and 20 filler items (see Appendix C). On each empathy item a person can score 2, 1, 
or 0, so the EQ has a maximum score of 80 and a minimum score of zero. The EQ 
has been shown to have high test–retest reliability (r=0.835; Lawrence, Shaw, 
Baker, Baron-Cohen, & David, 2004). It has further been shown to be associated 
with performance on the Eyes Task (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), a non-verbal mental 
state inference test. The EQ also has a moderate association with the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Scale (Davis, 1980), another tool measuring empathy. These results 
indicate concurrent validity. Lawrence et al. (2004) report that only three EQ items 
correlated with the Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) indicating 
that the EQ has a satisfactory construct validity. Cronbach alpha for the EQ (40 
items) was .87 in the current study, indicating high internal consistency. Two 
models of the EQ were tested, based on the 28-item version by Lawrence et al. 
(2004) and the 15-item version by Muncer and Ling (2006). Firstly, a maximum 
likelihood factor analysis with subsequent oblique rotation (oblimin) was performed 
on the 28 items that Lawrence et al. (2004) included in their analysis (items that 
were removed: 10, 11, 15, 18, 28, 34, 37-39, 46, 49, 60). As with Lawrence et al. 
(2004) both scree plot and Eigenvalues indicated that the first three factors were the 
strongest, accounting for 40.8% of the total variance. The pattern of items loading 
on the first three factors was identical to that reported by Lawrence et al. (2004), and 
the three factors overlap with traditional ideas of empathy: cognitive empathy 
(includes items that measure the appreciation of others’ affective states), emotional 
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reactivity (includes items of emotional reaction in response to others’ mental states) 
and social skills (includes items that explore the spontaneous use of social skills 
and/or a lack of intuitive social understanding). Cronbach alpha for the 28-item 
cognitive empathy score was .64, for the emotional reactivity score it was .76, and 
for the social skills score it was .63. Secondly, a recent confirmatory factor analytic 
study by Muncer and Ling (2006) further allow a short 3 factor version of the EQ 
with five items per subscale. A maximum likelihood factor analysis was conducted 
with the 15 items Muncer et al. (2006) report. A three-factor solution emerged, 
explaining 46.2% of the total variance. Following oblique rotation (oblimin) the 
item-loading pattern completely matched that reported by Muncer et al. (2006; 
cognitive – items 25, 26, 44, 52, 54, emotional – items 6, 27, 32, 50, 59, social skills 
– items 4, 8, 12, 14, 35). Cronbach alpha for the 5-item cognitive empathy score 
(Muncer et al., 2006) was .80, for the emotional reactivity score it was .58, and for 
the social skills score it was .64. These results are similar to those reported by 
Muncer et al. (2006). As Cronbach alphas for the 28-item version of the EQ were 
less variable, these three subscale scores (cognitive empathy, emotional reactivity, 
social skills) were used in subsequent regression analyses.  
 Social Comparison Scale (SCS): The SCS was developed by Allan and 
Gilbert (1995) and dimensions of social comparison are measured, focusing on 
judgments of social rank, relative attractiveness and group fit. Participants were 
asked to rate how they, in relationship to others, generally feel, by putting a mark on 
a 5-point scale anchored with 11 bipolar constructs (e.g. inferior-superior, 
incompetent-competent, unlikable-likable; for complete set of items see Appendix 
G). Due to an error participants were asked to make their rating on a 5-point scale, 
rather than a 10-point scale as Allan et al. (1995) had done. This will have led to a 
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smaller variance on this scale for the sample reported here, and means will not be 
directly comparable to previously published results. A maximum likelihood factor 
analysis with subsequent oblique rotation (oblimin) was conducted. As with Allan et 
al. (1995) scree plots and eigenvalues revealed that two factors explained 61% of the 
total variance. The pattern of items loading on the two factors was very close to that 
reported by Allan et al. (1995) but not completely replicated. Items 9 (undesirable-
more desirable) and 10 (unattractive-more attractive) loaded strongly on the rank 
factor, rather than on both the rank and social group fit factor as reported by Allan et 
al. (1995). Item 3 (unlikable-likable) only loaded on the social group fit factor, 
whereas Allan et al. (1995) had reported it to load equally strong on both factors. 
Allan et al. (1995) describe the three items (3, 9, 10) as all measuring social 
attractiveness, which overlaps with both rank and social fit judgments, but are not 
easily captured in a separate factor (i.e. clinical population in Allan et al., 1995). In 
the present study a score for subscales rank (items 1, 2, 6-10) and social fit (items 3-
5, 11) were calculated and used in all subsequent analyses. Cronbach alpha for the 
rank and social fit subscale Cronbach alpha was .87 and .80 respectively.  
 The International Positive and Negative Affect Schedule, short-form (I-
PANAS-SF): The PANAS is self-report measure of positive (PA) and negative 
affect (NA) developed by Watson, Clark, and Tellegen (1988). NA and PA reflect 
dispositional dimensions, with high-NA being marked by subjective distress and 
unpleasurable engagement, and low NA by the absence of these feelings. By 
contrast, PA represents the extent to which an individual experiences pleasurable 
engagement with the environment. PANAS NA and PA scales index two distinct, 
but moderately negatively correlated, factors (Crawford & Henry, 2004). Thompson 
(2007) developed a 10-item international short-form, which was used in this study. 
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A maximum likelihood factor analysis revealed two or three factors. Following 
oblique rotation the loading pattern of items on factors was identical to that reported 
by Thompson (2007), with the only exception of item ‘hostile’, which loaded on the 
third factor on its own. Therefore two scores were calculated for each participant, 
one for positive and one for negative affect. The PA subscale had a Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.67, indicating a borderline adequate reliability. The NA subscale had a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.71, indicating adequate reliability. The PA and NA subscales 
were correlated with each other (r = -.28, p < .00), similar to what Thompson (2007) 
reported for their data set. Participants were asked to ‘Thinking about yourself and 
how you normally feel, to what extent do you generally feel;’ and then were 
presented with 10 different words (e.g. hostile, inspired). Items were answered on a 
5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (always feel like this) to 5 (never feel like this). 
See Appendix E for items of the I-PANAS-SF. 
Data analyses 
Data were analysed using PASW (formerly SPSS) Statistics for Windows version 
18. Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was conducted using EQS version 6.1 
(Bentler, 1996). SEM is a hypothesis testing approach where a theoretical models of 
the relationship of dependent and predictor variables is hypothesised and 
subsequently tested for how well the model fits the data.  
The dependent variable, Paranoia Scale score, and the predictor variables (age, 
gender, PAM, ELES, EQ, SCS and I-PANAS-SF) were entered into two multiple 
regression analyses: hierarchical, then stepwise. The hierarchical method was used 
first, to test the contribution of predictors that have previously not been used to 
predict propensity for paranoid thinking in an analogue study (i.e. EQ and ELES). 
Stepwise regression was selected because the hierarchical model included one non-
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significant coefficient, indicating that a variable (SCS) did not contribute to the 
model. The order of measures entered into the regression was gender, age, PNS, 
ELES, PAM, EQ, SCS).  
For the SEM, robust model statistics were reported that are corrected for non-normal 
distributions. Goodness of fit of all models was evaluated using the Satorra–Bentler 
robust fit statistics: The Satorra–Bentler !2 (S–B !2) and the Robust Comparative Fit 
Index (RCFI; Bentler, 1998). The chi-squared is the most commonly used measure 
of model fit, with a high chi-squared value with a significant p value suggesting a 
poor fit of the model to the data. It should be noted that S-B !2 is most likely too 
conservative a test for the large sample at hand, and produces an excess of Type I 
errors (Fouladi, 2009). The RCFI ranges from 0 to 1 with values greater than 0.90 
indicating a good fit. The Root Mean Square of Approximation (RMSEA; Browne 
& Cudeck, 1993) is a measure of fit that takes into account a model’s complexity 
where a RMSEA of 0.10 or less indicates a good model fit.  
 
Results 
Means and Standard Deviations for Measures 
Measures of central tendency are given in Table 1, together with information on 
skewness and kurtosis. For comparison, the descriptive data from previously 
published studies are also illustrated. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests revealed data for 
all measures to be non-normal. It was decided to use untransformed data for all 
subsequent analyses.  
Paranoia Scale 
The responses on the PS were skewed towards the low end, indicating that 
participants were more likely to not report paranoid thoughts. However, 51.7% of 
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participants selected a response that indicated agreement with paranoid statements to 
some extent (i.e. 21.8% selecting option 2, 14.4% option 3, 10.2% option 4 and 
5.2% option 5) on 5-point Likert scale. This is very similar to the data from a 
student sample reported by Feiningstein et al. (1992; see Table 1). In order to 
evaluate which items were most likely to be endorsed by participants as applicable 
or highly applicable to them (option 4 or 5 on the 5-point Likert scale) see Table 2. 
As with the data reported by Freeman (2007), items regarding social evaluative 
concerns are those most commonly endorsed by participants (‘have been talked 
about behind my back’). On the other hand, items regarding severe threat (‘Someone 
has it in for me’) are only endorsed by a small number of participants. As with 
Freeman (2007) we find a hierarchical organisation in relation to the endorsement of 
paranoid thoughts.  
The distribution of ELES scores was strongly left skewed indicating that the 
majority of participants overall recall low numbers of perceived threat or 
subordination in childhood. 
The results for the entire sample revealed gender difference in empathy (EQ), which 
is congruent with previously reported results (Baron-Cohen et al., 2004). 
Exploration of Data 
Males had significantly higher scores on the Paranoia Scale (z = -6.35, p < .000). 
Table 3 illustrates the correlations between the measures used in this study. It was 
noted that younger participants tended to have higher PS scores (r = -.12, p < .000). 
Gender and age were added as covariate in all subsequent analyses.  
_____________________________ 
INSERT TALBE 1 ABOUT HERE 
_____________________________ 
Developmental Pathways of Paranoid Thinking 
 83 
_____________________________ 
INSERT TALBE 2 ABOUT HERE 
_____________________________ 
Predicting paranoia 
Regression analyses: For the hierarchical model, the predictor variables were 
entered in the following order: gender, age, I-PANAS-SF (PA and NA), ELES 
(threat, submissiveness, autonomy), PAM (anxiety, avoidance), EQ (cognitive, 
emotional, social skills) and SCS (fit, rank). The correlation matrix for all predictor 
variables and the outcome variable and the results of the multiple regression 
analyses for paranoid thinking (PS) are presented in Table 3 and 4.  
_____________________________ 
INSERT TALBE 3 ABOUT HERE 
_____________________________ 
In the hierarchical method of multiple regression, on step 1 when age and gender 
were entered the multiple R was 0.261, R
2
 was 0.068, adjusted R
2
 was 0.066 and 
significant (F = 26.33, p < .000). On step 2, when the I-PANAS-SF variables were 
entered the multiple R was 0.541, R
2
 was 0.292, adjusted R
2
 was 0.288, and the 
increment in R
2 
0.224 and significant (F = 113.56, p < .000).  On step 3 when the 
ELES variables were entered the multiple R was 0.645, R
2 
was 0.416, the adjusted 
R
2 
was 0.410 and the increment in R
2
 0.123 was significant (F = 50.14, p < .000).  
On step 4 when the PAM variables were entered the multiple R was 0.68, R
2 
was 
0.426, the adjusted R
2 
was 0.455, the increment in R
2 
of 0.046 was significant (F = 
30.56, p < .000). On step 5 when the EQ variables were entered the multiple R was 
0.696, R
2 
was 0.485, the adjusted R
2 
was 0.476, the increment in R
2 
of 0.023 was 
significant (F = 10.51, p < .000). On the final step when the SCS variables were 
entered, the multiple R was 0.698, the R
2
 was 0.487, adjusted R
2
 was 0.477 and the 
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increment in R
2
 of 0.003 was not significant (F = 1.7, p < 0.172), indicating that the 
addition of SCS variables did not account for any additional variance. 
_____________________________ 
INSERT TALBE 4 ABOUT HERE 
_____________________________ 
When all predictor variables (n = 14) were entered into the stepwise model, 11 
variables remained significant for inclusion and accounted for 47% of the variance.  
ELES submissiveness accounted for 24.2% of the variance with R
2
 of 0.242, with a 
multiple R of 0.492. I-PANAS-SF negative affect (NA) accounted for an additional 
9.5% of the variance with an increment in R
2 
of 0.095, R
2 
of 0.337 and multiple R of 
0.580. EQ emotional reactivity accounted for an additional 5.3% of the variance 
with an increment in R
2 
of 0.053, R
2 
of 0.39 and multiple R of 0.625. PAM 
attachment anxiety accounted for an additional 3.3 % of the variance with an 
increment in R
2 
of 0.033, R
2 
of 0.423 and multiple R of 0.651. PAM avoidance 
accounted for an additional 1.7% of the variance with an increment in R
2 
of 0.017, 
R
2 
of 0.440 and multiple R of 0.663. Age accounted for an additional 1.7% of the 
variance with an increment in R
2 
of 0.017, R
2 
of 0.457 and multiple R of 0.676. 
Gender accounted for an additional 1% of the variance with an increment in R
2 
of 
0.01, R
2 
of 0.467 and multiple R of 0.683. EQ cognitive empathy accounted for an 
additional 0.6% of the variance with an increment in R
2 
of 0.006, R
2 
of 0.437 and 
multiple R of 0.688. EQ social skills accounted for an additional 0.5% of the 
variance with an increment in R
2 
of 0.005, R
2 
of 0.478 and multiple R of 0.691. 
ELES autonomy accounted for an additional 0.3% of the variance with an increment 
in R
2 
of 0.003, R
2 
of 0.481 and multiple R of 0.693. ELES threat accounted for an 
additional 0.3% of the variance with an increment in R
2 
of 0.003, R
2 
of 0.484 and 
multiple R of 0.696. 
Developmental Pathways of Paranoid Thinking 
 85 
Structural equation models: The Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1992) was 
the dependent variable for all models that were explored. As set out in the 
introduction, several paths have been suggested to contribute to the development 
and maintenance of paranoia: directly path from early life experience, cognitive 
path, and an affect regulation pathway. 
For the first model (‘cognitive model’; Figure 1) it was hypothesised that early life 
experiences (as latent variable, with the three sub-scales of the ELES loading on it), 
mediated by attachment anxiety/avoidance (direct measurement variables) and 
Empathy (as latent variable, with sub-scale cognitive empathy and emotional 
reactivity of EQ loading on it) would predict paranoia. This model had a relatively 
poor fit: S-B !2 = 792.79 (p = .000) with a RCFI = 0.661 and a RMSEA = 0.138. 
For the second model, a direct pathway from the latent variable Early Life 
Experience onto paranoia was added to the two mediating variables (‘hybrid model’ 
as cognitive and direct pathway; Figure 2). Reflecting the gender differences for EQ, 
gender was added to contribute to the latent variable Empathy. This model also had 
a relatively poor fit: S-B !2 = 715.34 (p = .000) with a RCFI = 0.696 and a RMSEA 
= 0.132. 
A third ‘developmental affect regulation’ model (Figure 3) was tested. Based on the 
high predictive value the I-PANAS-SF had in both regression analyses a further 
latent variable, Affect (with PA and NA from I-PANAS-SF loading on it), was 
added to the previous model. The path between Affect and Empathy was included in 
this model, as was the path between Early Life Experience and Affect. This model 
had excellent fit: S-B !2 = 175.92 (p = .000) with a RCFI = 0.934 and a RMSEA = 
0.073. Attachment anxiety and Affect revealed a strong negative relationship (see 
Figure 3), whereas attachment avoidance had a less strong, and positive relationship. 
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Early Life Experience, through the mediating variable of attachment 
anxiety/avoidance, and moderated by the latent variable Affect, had a strong 
predictive value towards paranoia. The addition of Affect as latent variable changed 
the connection between Early Life Experience and Empathy, as it became non-
significant. Further, Affect was positively related to Empathy. As opposed to the 
connection between Empathy and paranoia in the cognitive model, Empathy now 
was related to paranoia negatively. 
_____________________________ 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
_____________________________ 
_____________________________ 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
_____________________________ 
_____________________________ 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
_____________________________ 
 
Discussion 
This study set out to investigate the predictive role of early life experience, 
attachment style and ability to empathise for paranoia in a non-clinical sample. The 
results demonstrated that about half (51.7 %) of the sample endorsed a response that 
indicated agreement with paranoid statements to some extent. These results are 
similar to those reported by Feiningstein et al. (1992) in a student sample.  
Our hypothesis that attachment anxiety/avoidance would be related to paranoia was 
partly confirmed in the regression analysis. However, the contribution in explaining 
the total variance in paranoia was rather small for both hierarchical and stepwise 
regressions. The same was also true for empathy, with the results of the stepwise 
regression indicating emotional reactivity (e. g. items “I usually stay emotionally 
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detached when watching a film”, “Feel that other people crying doesn’t upset me”, 
“Tend to get emotionally involved with friends’ problems”) explaining a 
considerable amount of variance in paranoia. This supports the hypothesis that lack 
of ability to empathise with others may contribute to paranoid thinking, and also 
contribute to the maintenance of paranoid thinking. 
Early life experience, as measured by ELES (Gilbert et al., 2003), proved to have a 
substantial predictive value towards paranoia in both types of regression analysis. 
Interestingly, it was predominantly the factor submissiveness on the ELES that 
explained a large variance in paranoia. However, as this result is from the stepwise 
regression, the limitations of this analysis have to be noted. Models identified by 
stepwise methods have an inflated risk of building on chance features of the data 
(Judd & McClelland, 1989). Finally, Judd et al. (1989) also highlighted how 
stepwise methods will not necessarily produce the best model if there are redundant 
predictors. This is of course why SEM was a valuable method to choose next, as it 
allows specifying latent variables (i. e. variables that can explain the overlap in 
predictors).  
The SEM results from this analogue study tested three models, each focusing on a 
different pathway that has been suggested to contribute to paranoia (cognitive 
effects of attachment style, direct effect of early life experience, developmental 
effects of affect regulation). A ‘cognitive’ model, with attachment 
anxiety/avoidance and empathy as mediating variables between early life experience 
and paranoia, did not reveal a good model fit. A ‘hybrid’ model, which expanded 
the ‘cognitive’ model by addition of a direct pathway from early life experience to 
paranoia, did not reveal good model fit either. However, a final ‘developmental 
affect regulation’ model revealed good model fit. This model included affect as 
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latent variable. The results support an account for mediated relationship between 
early life experience and paranoia. The first mediation is between an interaction of 
attachment and affect. The second mediation is between an interaction of attachment 
and empathy. These results are consistent with a developmental model where early 
attachment experiences provide the context for the development of affect regulation 
and mentalisation. In the early caregiver-infant interactions, with the help of 
contingent marked mirroring of actions by the caregiver, a symbolic representational 
system of affective states emerges and assists the development of affect regulation 
(Fonagy & Target, 1997). Similarly, a regulatory function is also mirrored in the 
negative relationship between empathy and paranoia. A relatively lower empathy 
score (EQ) increases the likelihood to misinterpret others’ behaviour as threatening 
or persecutory. The positive relationship between the latent variables Affect and 
Empathy in the SEM further highlights how affect can impact on the ability to 
mentalise. That is, while experiencing high levels of negative affect, the ability to 
mentalise (i.e. hold other peoples states-of-mind in mind, Fonagy et al., 2004) may 
be reduced, and paranoid thinking is more likely.  
The results further highlight how early life experience does not only impact on 
cognitive styles, but how it influences the development of self-regulatory processes 
(affect regulation, as well as ability to mentalise). Interestingly, early life experience 
did not directly impact on empathy. It is only via attachment anxiety/avoidance and 
in the relationship with Affect that Empathy has a negative relationship with 
paranoia. This is congruent with the theoretical framework that infants are only able 
to develop internal working models, which allow an understanding of psychological 
characteristics of other people, in the presence of a caregiver (Fonagy et al., 2004). 
This is supported by evidence that suggested direct links between caregivers’ 
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interaction with their infants and their children’s later understanding of mind (e. g. 
mind-mindedness in mothers, Meins et al., 2002; use of mental state language, 
Taumeopeau & Ruffman, 2008). 
It is important to keep in mind that the tool used for measuring early life experience 
(ELES, Gilbert et al., 2003) in the current study is a self-report measure, focused on 
recall of personal feelings of perceived threat and subordination in childhood in the 
family context. This precludes parental behaviour, such as abuse or neglect directly, 
and also does not include traumatic experiences a person may have had outside the 
family context. Early life experience impacted on current attachment 
anxiety/avoidance, but attachment anxiety/avoidance did not impact on paranoia at 
all (non significant path in ‘developmental affect regulation’ model, Figure 3). This 
is at odds with Berry et al.’s (2006) proposal of specific associations between 
positive psychotic phenomena and anxiety in attachment relationships. The data of 
the current analogue study do not confirm this pathway, unless affect is included as 
a latent variable.  
The observation that early life experience was predictive of attachment 
anxiety/avoidance is somewhat different from Berry et al. (2006) observation in an 
analogue study. Berry et al. (2006) found no strong or consistent relationships 
between attachment and parental relationships, nor between attachment and 
experiences of trauma. The positive findings in the current study may highlight how 
the recall of personal feelings of perceived threat and subordination in childhood are 
far more important than direct recall of events. 
It is further important to note that this study employed a cross-sectional design, 
using participant report of past experience and current state. It is therefore not 
possible to deduce a causal developmental pathway from the current data. However, 
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this study may be a stepping stone for future research, highlighting how a 
longitudinal approach may be promising. For example, a cohort of students could be 
invited to take part in a similar study as reported here, with data points sampled at 
the beginning and end of their time at university. This would allow for data that 
would be more powerful with regard to making developmental claims.   
The results from this analogue sample cannot directly inform clinical practice for the 
obvious reasons of not studying a clinical population. Further, the self-report 
attachment style measure employed only gives information about the level of 
anxiety and avoidance in an attachment context, not overall attachment style. In 
addition self-report measures are less robust than an interview-based measurement 
of attachment (e.g. the AAI). However, this analogue study has implications for 
clinical practice. The role of multiple routes of predicting paranoia highlight that a 
multilevel approach in formulating paranoia is likely to be important. Early life 
experience, subsequent attachment anxiety and avoidance are important to consider, 
especially in relation to estimating what emotional self-regulatory ability a person 
can draw on. Assessing and formulating a person’s interpersonal developmental 
history will inform the clinician on the available resources a person has for self-
regulation, both stemming from affect regulatory processes, but also from 
mentalisation-based processes.  
Further research is needed to investigate whether the role of mentalising in paranoia 
is applicable in clinical populations. Further, it remains to be investigated whether 
the role of early life experience on the development of attachment style, affect and 
their interaction is similar in a clinical population. 
Limitations: The current study has a number of limitations. Firstly, the 
sample consisted of students who were self-selected, as recruitment was by e-mail, 
Developmental Pathways of Paranoid Thinking 
 91 
and contained a majority of female participants. It is possible that people who self-
select for such studies may be more prone to psychological problems (Freeman et 
al., 2005). The use of questionnaires to measure attachment style leads to the 
possibility of self-reporting biases (e.g. social desirability). However, the anonymity 
of internet research may reduce, but not completely abolish, the effect of social 
desirability (Freeman et al., 2005).  
A relatively lower relationship was observed between attachment avoidance and 
affect (.254, compared to -.653 between attachment anxiety and affect). This may be 
due to individuals with dismissing attachment under-reporting distress (Dozier & 
Lee, 1995). Which ties in with the more general limitation of research on attachment 
and psychopathology. The very nature of attachment style being not necessarily 
accessible to conscious and self-reflective processes makes the study of attachment 
by means of self-report measures difficult (Crowell et al., 1999). However, it is 
likely that especially for individuals with an attachment avoidant stance this may 
play out as them reporting more security in attachment context, as their dominant 
sense of self as secure precludes an awareness of attachment insecurities. 
 Conclusion: The results from this analogue study highlight how common 
paranoid thinking is in the general population (albeit this was a student sample), and 
how it is more helpful to see this paranoia as part of the mainstream developmental 
psychology. The results highlight a developmental pathway to paranoia. Early life 
experiences impact on two self-regulatory pathways: the ability to affect regulate 
and the ability to mentalise. Both affect regulation and mentalising were shown to 
be related to paranoia. Attachment anxiety/avoidance per se was not a significant 
predictor of paranoia. However, taking affect into account, it was possible to 
strongly predict paranoia. This highlights how affect regulation emerges in the 
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attachment context. Overall the data fit a developmental approach to paranoia. 
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Captions 
Table 1. Descriptive data for all measures. 
Table 2. Frequency with which items endorsed* 
Table 3. Pearson Correlations between all measures. 
Table 4. Multiple regression analyses (hierarchical and stepwise), predicting 
paranoid thinking. 
Figure 1. Path model ‘cognitive’ for relationship of early life experience on 
paranoia, via attachment style and empathy. 
Figure 2. Path model ‘hybrid’, for cognitive pathways and direct effect of early life 
experience on paranoia. 
Figure 3. Path model ‘developmental affect regulation’, for relationship of early life 
experience on paranoia. 
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Previously published data  
Mean SD Median IQR 
Skew-
ness 
Kurtosis 
M SD 
PS 40.44 14.32 38 21 .69 -.12 42.7
 
10.2 
1 
PAM Attachment anxiety 1.02 .61 .88 1 .63 -.15 1.20
 
.65 
2 
PAM Attachment avoidance 1.31 .58 1.38 1 .08 -.44 1.44 .58 
2
 
ELES  36.39 8.4 34 11 .98 .63 32.53 12.02 
3
 
    Threat 11.02 5.55 9 7 1.43 1.61 11.26 5.67 
3
 
    Submissiveness 13.78 5.41 13 7 .72 .04 14.21 5.24 
3
 
    Autonomy 11.58 2.96 12 4 -.77 -.30 7.06 2.91 
3
 
EQ 44.45 11.94 45 0 -.18 -.45 42.53 10.84 
4
 
    EQ-28 31.46 9.52 32 13 -.18 -.44  
    Short EQ Cognitive 5.51 2.38 5 3 -.008 -.42  
    Short EQ Affective 5.75 2.21 6 3 -.23 -.57  
    Short EQ Social skills 5.90 2.43 6 4 -.12 -.73  
SCS  36.01 8.10 37 11 -.48 -.12  
    Rank 22.92 5.54 23 7 -.46 -.007  
    Social fit 13.08 3.59 13 5 -.33 -.38  
I-PANAS-SF 28.84 3.28 29 4 .13 .78  
    PA 17.85 3.28 18 4 -.36 .43 19.48 2.89 
5
 
    NA 10.99 2.81 11 4 .56 .45 11.21 2.04 
5
 
Note: N = 722. IQR – Interquartile Range. PS – Paranoia Scale, PAM – Psychosis Attachment Measure (Anxious/Avoidant – anxious/avoidant attachment 
style), ELES – Early Life Experiences Scale, EQ – Empathy Quotient, EQ-28 – Empathy Quotient over subset of 28 items (Lawrence et al., 2004), Short EQ 
(Muncer et al., 2006), SCS – Social Comparison Scale, I-PANAS-SF – The International Positive and Negative Affect Schedule, short-form; PA – positive 
affect, NA – negative affect. 1) Feiningstein et al. (1992): Sample across several studies, N = 581; 2) Pers. communic. K. Berry: N = 323; 3); Gilbert et al. 
(2003): N = 220; 4) Muncer et al. (2006): N = 348; 5) Thompson (2007), UK sample, N = 29. 
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 % 
I sometimes feel as if I’m being followed.  5 
I am sure I get a raw deal from life.  6 
No one really cares much what happens to you. 8 
Most people make friends because friends are likely to be useful to them.  8 
Someone has been trying to influence my mind.  8 
Someone has it in for me. 9 
I believe that I have often been punished without cause.  9 
I have often found people jealous of my good ideas just because they had not 
thought of them first.  9 
Most people inwardly dislike putting themselves out to help other people.  11 
I am bothered by people outside, in cars, in stores, etc. watching me. 11 
My parents and family find more fault with me than they should.  11 
It is safer to trust no one.  12 
Some people have tried to steal my ideas and taken credit for them.  13 
Most people will use somewhat unfair means to gain profit or an advantage, rather 
than lose it. 20 
I often wonder what hidden reason another person may have for doing something 
nice for you.  20 
I have often felt that strangers were looking at me critically.  22 
People often disappoint me.  22 
I tend to be on my guard with people who are somewhat more friendly than I 
expect. 25 
People have said insulting and unkind things about me. 35 
I am sure I have been talked about behind my back.  45 
*Note: Percentages are for each item having been endorsed by participants as 4 or 5 on the 
5-point Likert scale (with 1 = not at all applicable to me, and 5 = extremely applicable to 
me).  
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4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 NA 
3) PS .446** .373** .481** .319** .355** .492** -.288** -.064 -.201** -.376** -.238** -.394** -.241** .463** 
4) PAM-Anx  .166** .869** .862** .202** .366** -.215** -.01 .09* -.348** -.424** -.388** -.320** .542** 
5) PAM-Avoid   .380** -.006 .159** .267** -.279** -.172** -.299** -.363** -.236** -.444** -.188** .263** 
6) ELES-threat      .695** -.569** .014 -.104** -.154** -.101** -.173** -.108** .193** 
7) ELES-subm       -.645** -.019 -.058 -.258** -.299** -.332** -.174** .357** 
8) ELES-auto        .123** .117** .232** .258** .338** .154** -.267** 
9) EQ-cog         .320** .381** .148** .212** .215** -.058 
10) EQ-emo          .191** -.103** .126** .118** .007 
11) EQ-soc           .318** .505** .273** -.395** 
12) SCS-rank            .55** .426** -.45** 
13) SCS-fit             .346** -.463** 
14) PA              -.285** 
Note: N = 722. PS – Paranoia Scale, PAM – Psychosis Attachment Measure (Anxious/Avoidant –attachment anxiety/avoidance), ELES – Early Life Experiences Scale: threat, 
submissiveness, autonomy subscales, EQ-28 – Empathy Quotient over subset of 28 items (Lawrence et al., 2004): cognitive empathy, emotional reactivity, social skills subscale, SCS – 
Social Comparison Scale: social group fit and rank subscale, I-PANAS-SF – The International Positive and Negative Affect Schedule, short-form; PA – positive affect, NA – negative 
affect. *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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 R R
2
 Adjusted 
R
2
 
F Sig. of 
F 
Beta* 
HIERIERCHIC
AL MODEL 
      
Gender 
Age 
.261 0.068 0.066 4.082 .000 - .093 
- .120 
PA 
NA  
.541 .292 .288 113.56 .000 -.040 
.192 
ELES-threat 
ELES-subm 
ELES-auto 
.645 .416 .410 50.14 .000 .076 
.302 
.096 
PAM-anx 
PAM-avoid 
.680 .462 .455 30.56 .000 .179 
.128 
EQ-cog 
EQ-emo 
EQ-soc 
.696 .485 .476 10.51 .000 .101 
-.157 
-.081 
SCS-rank 
SCS-fit 
.698 .487 .477 1.76 .172 .062 
-.054 
STEPWISE 
MODEL 
      
ELES-subm  
NA 
EQ-emo 
PAM-anx  
PAM-avoid 
Age 
Gender 
EQ-cog 
EQ-soc 
ELES-auto 
ELES-threat 
.492 
.580 
.625 
.651 
.663 
.676 
.683 
.688 
.691 
.693 
.696 
.242 
.337 
.390 
.423 
.440 
.457 
.467 
.473 
.478 
.481 
.484 
.241 
.335 
.388 
.420 
.436 
.452 
.462 
.467 
.471 
.474 
.476 
230.28 
182.56 
153.28 
131.53 
112.60 
100.16 
89.27 
79.90 
72.35 
65.85 
60.51 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.296 
.192 
-.171 
.184 
.136 
-.120 
-.099 
.102 
-.089 
.094 
.080 
* The standardised regression coefficient or beta and the partial correlation are 
shown, which indicated the importance of the independent contribution of each 
variable at the final stage of analysis to the prediction of paranoid thinking when all 
other predictors are held constant). 
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Appendix A. Requirements for submission to Psychology and Psychotherapy: 
Theory Research and Practice.  
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Appendix B. Paranoia Scale (PS, Fenigstein et al., 1992). 
1. Someone has it in for me. 
2. I sometimes feel as if I’m being followed 
3. I believe that I have often been punished without cause. 
4. Some people have tried to steel my ideas and taken credit for them 
5. My parents and family find more fault with me than they should 
6. No one really cares much what happens to you. 
7. I am sure I get a raw deal from life 
8. Most people will use somewhat unfair means to gain profit or an advantage, 
rather than lose it. 
9. I often wonder what hidden reason another person may have for doing 
something nice for you. 
10. It is safer to trust no one. 
11. I have often felt that strangers were looking at me critically. 
12. Most people make friends because friends are likely to be useful to them. 
13. Someone has been trying to influence my mind. 
14. I am sure I have been talked about behind my back. 
15. Most people inwardly dislike putting themselves out to help other people. 
16. I tend to be on my guard with people who are somewhat more friendly than I 
expect. 
17. People have said insulting and unkind things about me. 
18. People often disappoint me. 
19. I am bothered by people outside, in cars, in stores, etc. watching me. 
20. I have often found people jealous of my good ideas just because they had not 
thought of them first. 
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Appendix C. Empathy Quotient (EQ, Baron-Cohen et al., 2004). 
Note, filler items (20) have been removed.  
1. I can easily tell if someone else wants to enter a conversation. 
2. I find it difficult to explain to others things that I understand easily, when they 
don't understand it first time. 
3. I really enjoy caring for other people. 
4. I find it hard to know what to do in a social situation. 
5. People often tell me that I went too far in driving my point home in a discussion. 
6. It doesn't bother me too much if I am late meeting a friend. 
7. Friendships and relationships are just too difficult, so I tend not to bother with 
them. 
8. I often find it difficult to judge if something is rude or polite. 
9. In a conversation, I tend to focus on my own thoughts rather than on what my 
listener might be thinking. 
10. When I was a child, I enjoyed cutting up worms to see what would happen. 
11. I can pick up quickly if someone says one thing but means another. 
12. It is hard for me to see why some things upset people so much. 
13. I find it easy to put myself in somebody else's shoes. 
14. I am good at predicting how someone will feel. 
15. I am quick to spot when someone in a group is feeling awkward or 
uncomfortable. 
16. If I say something that someone else is offended by, I think that that's their 
problem, not mine. 
17. If anyone asked me if I liked their haircut, I would reply truthfully, even if I 
didn't  like it. 
18. I can't always see why someone should have felt offended by a remark. 
19. Seeing people cry doesn't really upset me. 
20. I am very blunt, which some people take to be rudeness, even though this is 
unintentional. 
21. I don’t tend to find social situations confusing. 
22. Other people tell me I am good at understanding how they are feeling and what 
they are thinking. 
23. When I talk to people, I tend to talk about their experiences rather than my own. 
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24. It upsets me to see an animal in pain. 
25. I am able to make decisions without being influenced by people's feelings. 
26. I can easily tell if someone else is interested or bored with what I am saying. 
27. I get upset if I see people suffering on news programs. 
28. Friends usually talk to me about their problems as they say that I am very 
understanding. 
29. I can sense if I am intruding, even if the other person doesn't tell me. 
30. People sometimes tell me that I have gone too far with teasing. 
31. Other people often say that I am insensitive, though I don’t always see why. 
32. If I see a stranger in a group, I think that it is up to them to make an effort to join 
in. 
33. I usually stay emotionally detached when watching a film. 
34. I can tune into how someone else feels rapidly and intuitively. 
35. I can easily work out what another person might want to talk about. 
36. I can tell if someone is masking their true emotion. 
37. I don't consciously work out the rules of social situations. 
38. I am good at predicting what someone will do. 
39. I tend to get emotionally involved with a friend's problems. 
40. I can usually appreciate the other person's viewpoint, even if I don't  agree with it. 
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Appendix D. Psychosis Attachment Measure (PAM, Berry 2006). 
1. I prefer not to let other people know my ‘true’ thoughts and feelings. 
2. I find it easy to depend on other people for support with problems or difficult. 
3. I tend to get upset, anxious or angry if other people are not there when I need      
them. 
4. I usually discuss my problems and concerns with other people. (reverse item)  
5. I worry that key people in my life won’t be around in the future.  
situations. (reverse item) 
6. I frequently ask other people to reassure me that they care about me.  
7. If other people disapprove of something I do, I get very upset.  
8. I find it hard to accept help from other people when I have problems or 
difficulties. 
9. I frequently wonder whether I can trust other people. 
10. I find it hard to believe that other people will be there for me if I need them. 
11. I worry that if other people get to know me better, they won’t like who I really 
am. 
12. When I’m feeling stressed, I prefer being on my own to being in the company  
of other people. 
13. I try to cope with stressful situations on my own. 
14. I believe that other people will never be concerned about me. 
15. I worry that if I displease other people, they won’t want to know me anymore.   
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Appendix E. The International Positive and Negative Affect Schedule Short Form 
(I-PANS-SF, Thompson, 2007). 
Question: Thinking about yourself and how you normally feel, to what extent do 
you generally feel:  
Upset  
Hostile  
Alert  
Ashamed  
Inspired  
Nervous  
Determined  
Attentive  
Afraid  
Active  
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Appendix F. Early Life Experiences Scale (ELES, Gilbert et al., 2003). 
1. I often had to give in to others at home 
2. I felt on edge because I was unsure if my parents might get angry with me 
3. I rarely felt my opinions mattered much 
4. There was little I could do to control my parents anger once they became angry 
5. If I didn’t do what others wanted I felt I would be rejected 
6. I felt able to assert myself in my family 
7. I felt very comfortable and relaxed around my parents  
8. My parents could hurt me if I did not behave in the way they wanted  
9. I felt an equal member of my family 
10. I often felt subordinate in my family 
11. My parents exerted control by threats and punishments 
12. I often had to go along with others even when I did not want to  
13. In order to avoid getting hurt I used to try to avoid my parents 
14. 
The atmosphere at home could suddenly become threatening for no obvious 
reason 
15. I experienced my parents as powerful and overwhelming 
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Appendix G. Social Comparison Scale (SCS, Allan and Gilbert,1995). 
In relation to others, I generally feel: 
Inferior 1 2 3 4 5 Superior 
Incompetent 1 2 3 4 5 Competent 
Unlikable 1 2 3 4 5 Likeable 
Left out 1 2 3 4 5 Accepted 
Different 1 2 3 4 5 Same 
Untalented 1 2 3 4 5 More talented 
Weaker 1 2 3 4 5 Stronger 
Unconfident 1 2 3 4 5 More confident 
Undesirable 1 2 3 4 5 More desirable 
Unattractive 1 2 3 4 5 More attractive 
Outsider 1 2 3 4 5 Insider 
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Abstract 
Background: Attachment styles are formed early in childhood and guide perception 
and behaviour in adulthood. They guide attention, interpretation, memory and 
predictions about future interpersonal interactions and influence psychosocial 
functioning in adulthood. Aims: This study wishes to investigate whether a 
consistent bias towards judging others’ intentions as threatening to the self, is related 
to and maintained by a lack of a specific social cognitive function, such as empathy. 
This study seeks to investigate the relationship between parenting experience and 
adult attachment style and their previously unexplored relationship to empathy. 
Methods: This study will use a range of self-report tools to assess parenting 
experience, current attachment style, paranoid thinking and level of empathy. A 
large data sample (N=250) for this analogue study will allow an exploration of the 
relationship of several variables with the help of structural equation modeling. 
Several specific models are proposed and will be tested. Applications: The findings 
of this study will shed light on the interaction of empathy, a social cognitive 
function, and paranoid thinking. This previously not directly explored relationship 
may shed light on how level of empathy impacts on paranoid thinking and its 
maintenance. This may indicate future therapeutic avenues to explore. However, the 
results will also shed more theoretical insight on how early parenting experience 
impacts on empathy and the propensity to paranoid thinking in later life. 
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Introduction 
Attachment and the development of internal working models 
Attachment theory, following the work of John Bowlby (1969, 1973, 1980), 
explores the way in which early attachment relationships shape styles of relating to 
others.  Attachment styles are internal working models of the self in relations to 
others that, once formed early in childhood, guide perception and behaviour in 
adulthood (Bowlby, 1980).  
Initially the availability and responsiveness of an infant’s primary carer to its needs, 
and in particular their role in emotion-regulation for the infant, shapes how the child 
comes to view the primary carer: as an available and responsive secure base, or not. 
The child is able to predict the availability of their primary carer. This expectation is 
the foundation to the internal working model of the self in relation to others in 
general. Thereby the view of others can be positive (benevolent) or negative 
(unavailable or even threatening), and the view of self can equally be positive (able, 
worthy and desirable) or negative (not able or worthy of care, and not desirable). 
The development of internal working models, results from an interplay of a) the 
‘attachment behavioural system’, which governs people’s, especially infants’, 
emotional attachment to their caregivers, and b) ‘caregiving behavioural system’, an 
innate behavioural system in parents and other caregivers that responds to the needs 
of dependent others (esp. to children, but also others).  
These working models are hypothesised to guide attention, interpretation, memory 
and predictions about future interpersonal interactions (Cassidy, 1999), and 
influence psychosocial functioning in adulthood. Aversive early childhood 
experience, such as abuse (Alexander, 1993), has been shown to be associated with 
insecure attachment style. 
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Attachment styles are hypothesised to be stable over time because working models 
direct attention to information that is consistent with representations, influence 
interpretations consistent with those representations, and also lead to the person to 
behave in a way that will elicit responses from others that are again consistent with 
their expectation. However, there is some recognition that working models can be 
revised as a result of significant interpersonal experiences, especially if there is a 
high inconsistency between the model and experience (see Berry, 2007). 
Attachment styles in adulthood, and ways of measuring these 
Two main approaches for the assessment of adult attachment styles have been 
developed. Main et al. (1985) developed the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) that 
measures attachment states of minds on the basis of the coherence of the 
individual’s narrative in describing parental-child relationships. This approach is 
very time consuming and requires fully trained interviewers and coders for transcript 
analysis. 
The more readily available tool for a wider research community are a number of 
self-report tools. Based on work in the area of mother-infant dyads by Ainsworth et 
al., Hazan and Shaver (1987) developed a self-report measure. They propose that 
three attachment styles capture the individual differences in the internal working 
models that adults use to organise their close relationships: securely attached, 
anxiously attached or avoidantly attached. 
Others have proposed four styles of attachment: secure, anxious, dismissive and 
fearful (Bartholomew and Horowitz, 1991). The self-report measure by these 
researchers simply requests participants to choose on of four descriptions that they 
think best describes their way of being in close relationships. 
However, a recent  review of attachment style questionnaires by Kurdek (2002) has 
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led to a questioning of the factor structure of attachment styles. Avoidance and 
anxiety emerged as reliable factors. This two-factor structure has recently been 
further substantiated by the results of an analogue study by MacBeth et al. (2008). 
Based on Kurdek’s (2002) study, which set out to test the psychometric properties of 
several self-report measures of adult attachment, the Relationship Scales 
Questinnaire (Griffin & Bartholomew, 1994) currently poses the best self-report tool 
for the purpose of assessing adult attachment style. 
Attachment style and psychotic phenomenology 
Research has recently has been driven more by a developmental achievement 
approach (e.g. Fonagy et al., 2004). This assumes that there are developmental 
histories (e.g. experience of primary caregivers in early life) that leave a person with 
more or less of an awareness of other people’s intentions, motivators and how these 
allow insight into their current and future actions. 
Gilbert (e.g. 2005) coined the term social mentalities, which is the interplay in social 
situations between emotional, motivational, cognitive, and behavioural processes as 
reflection of underlying neurobiological systems that have been shaped by 
evolution, which shape the relationship between self and others. These social 
mentalities are implicated in caregiving, care-eliciting, formation of interpersonal 
alliances, social rank and sexual behaviour. They also play a role in appraising 
threat, enhancing safeness and affect regulation. Secure attachment is associated 
with safeness and therefore deactivates threat-based mentalities. If however parental 
caregiving was such that no secure attachment style has been achieved, threat social 
mentalities (safety strategies, including vigilance for threat, paranoia) remain active. 
High levels of attachment insecurity lead to increased sensitivity to threat, which in 
turn has an effect on interpersonal functioning (Gerhardt, 2004): increased 
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emotional distress, impaired reflective functioning and mind-mindedness.   
Links between attachment style and psychosis have been demonstrated (Dozier et 
al., 1999), however, the research is still limited. In a recent review Berry (2007) 
highlighted evidence for an association between higher levels of attachment 
insecurity and dismissive-avoidant attachment in individuals with a diagnosis of 
psychosis.  
In an analogue study MacBeth et al. (2008) showed that both attachment and a 
strategy of interpersonal distancing predicted paranoia. This overlaps with Gilbert’s 
(2001) argument that social mentalities are crucial in the development and 
maintenance of persecutory ideation and delusions. It is evolutionarily adaptive to 
show heightened sensitivity to social threat cues. This can be understood as a safety 
strategy. However, if this occurs to excess then a person will be described as 
paranoid, and this threat-based social mentality dominates interpersonal 
relationships. In other words, paranoid thinking is an unintended consequence of an 
adaptive safety strategy. 
Attachment style and capacity for empathy 
The term empathy is a fairly modern translation of the German word Einfühlung 
(Titchener, 1909), which literally means “feeling into”. A well known phrase that 
expresses empathy by means of a vivid image is “To put yourself into somebody’s 
shoes”. Empathy allows us to tune into what somebody might be feeling, and what 
they might be thinking. It also allows us to predict what their intentions might be, 
and what they might do next. It allows us to feel an emotion, triggered by the 
emotion that the other person is expressing. Empathy is an important ability 
contributing to our functioning as social beings and has been widely studied in 
human and non-human primates (Preston and de Waal, 2002). Nevertheless, it has 
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proven somewhat difficult to define. Some have focussed more on the affective 
aspects of empathy (feeling an emotion, triggered by perceiving the expression of an 
emotion in another). Others have highlighted more cognitive aspects of empathy 
(understanding that another person might have a different perspective on the same 
situation). 
The ‘caregiving behavioural system’ is more likely to achieve its aims, if a person is 
securely attached and this allows them to focus on needs of someone else (Gillath, 
Shaver and Mikulincer, 2005). This is similar to Ainsworth et al.’s (1978) 
observation of children ceasing to explore the laboratory environment when their 
attachment figure left the room in the Strange Situation. If a person experiences 
attachment insecurity, this interferes with other non-attachment activities, including 
caregiving behaviours. Caregiving behaviours such as empathy and compassion will 
be inhibited if a person is currently preoccupied with their own proximity seeking to 
a secure base. This has been backed up with experimental studies, which used 
contextual priming of a sense of attachment security (by asking participants to 
recollect personal memories, read a story, or look at a picture of supportive others, 
or by subliminally exposing them to proximity-related words). Some of these 
experimental results suggest that attachment style is related to a person’s ability to 
empathise with others and subsequent helping behavior (Mikulincer, Gillath, 
Halevy, Avihou, Avidan, & Eshkoli, 2001; Westmaas & Silver, 2001). 
Paranoid thinking  
As our early attachment experience is the foundation to the internal working model 
of our self in relation to others in general, it is of particular interest to investigate the 
case when the view of others is markedly negative. This if of course highlighted in 
paranoid persons, who predominantly view others as threatening and negative. By 
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definition, when a person’s thinking is paranoid, they do not accurately judge other 
people’s intentions, motivations and thoughts towards them, but tend to hold a threat 
based appraisal of social and interpersonal situations. This study will focus on 
paranoid thinking as a window into investigating the relationship of early childhood 
experience (parenting and possible trauma) on attachment.  
Many have argued that psychotic symptoms such as delusions might be better 
understood on a continuum with normal experience (e.g. van Os & Verdoux, 2003).   
In line with this assumption, paranoid thinking has been proposed to be present in 
the normal population along a continuum. Paranoid delusions are held by 10-15% of 
the general population, according to a conservative estimate by Freeman (2007), and 
even subtypes of paranoia have been identified in a non-clinical sample (Combs et 
al., 2007). A number of theoretical approaches have been used to shed light on the 
origins, function and maintenance of paranoid thinking, which to review is beyond 
the scope of this proposal. 
Current study 
As outlined above, a person’s early care receiving experience shapes their internal 
working model of how they relate to others. If parental caregiving was such that no 
secure attachment style has been achieved, threat social mentalities remain active 
and safety strategies, including vigilance for threat and paranoia are adopted by the 
person.  
It is so far however unclear what the pathway between early childhood experience , 
attachment and paranoid thinking is. This study wishes to differentiate between two 
models, which will be elaborated on in the next section of this proposal. 
 
Aims and hypotheses 
Developmental Pathways of Paranoid Thinking 
 129 
Aims 
This study sets out to explore the way in which recall of early childhood experience 
and adult attachment style relates to a person’s ability to empathise, their propensity 
to paranoid thinking and degree of positive affect. This study wishes to test two 
specific hypotheses by a comparative analysis of fit of two specific path models 
exploring the role of early childhood experience, attachment style, paranoid 
thinking, empathy and positive affect. 
This study involves a non-clinical sample, as the aim is to investigate more general 
mechanisms that hold for the continuum of paranoid thinking.  
Hypotheses 
Model 1: Parenting experience effects attachment style, which in turn is 
predictive of paranoid thinking. 
This model reflects Berry’s (2007) evidence for an association between higher levels 
of attachment insecurity and dismissive-avoidant attachment in individuals with a 
diagnosis of psychosis. 
_____________________________ 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
_____________________________ 
 
Model 2: Attachment and paranoid thinking are a consequence of early 
childhood experience. They are safety strategies adopted by a person. Rather than 
paranoia being a consequence of attachment style, these are both factors that stand 
parallel to each other. However, an interaction between attachment style and 
paranoia is in addition part of this model. 
_____________________________ 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
_____________________________ 
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Reduced positive affect and ability to empathise are unintended consequences of 
attachment avoidance and paranoia in this model. More specifically, if negative 
parenting have shaped a threat-based appraisal of others, empathic understanding of 
others is reduced, and less positive affect is experienced. 
 
Plan of investigation 
Participants 
A group of non-clinical volunteers will be recruited for this study. Participants will 
be recruited from a university setting, including staff and students. 
Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Male and female participants, with an age range between 16 and 75, will be invited 
to take part in this research. This study aims to investigate paranoia in a non-clinical 
sample. However, truly sampling a non-clinical group would require conducting 
clinical interviews with each participant, in order to rule out psychological problems 
at a clinical level. Therefore a simple question as to current or past mental health 
problems will be included. 
Recruitment procedures 
Potential participants will be contacted via Email and asked to take part in the study 
by following a link embedded in the Email. This link will take them to a site hosting 
the self-report measures used in this study. Currently the plan is to contact the 
majority of student and staff of the University of Glasgow as well as University of 
Edinburgh via centrally held Email address lists. 
Measures 
 Paranoia Scale (PS): In order to assess trait paranoia, participants will be asked 
to complete the PS (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992). The PS was designed specifically 
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to measure the incidence of paranoia in a college population. The scale consists of 
20 items, measuring paranoid experience (e.g., ‘I sometimes feel as if I am being 
followed’) and paranoid beliefs (e.g., ‘It is safe to trust no-one’). Items are answered 
on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (not at all applicable to me) to 5 (extremely 
applicable to me). Responses are summed to produce a score, which ranges from 20 
to 100; higher scores reflect higher levels of subclinical paranoia. In a factor 
analysis of non-clinical groups, Fenigstein and Vanable (1992) found the scale to 
comprise of a single factor with Cronbach’s alpha of 0.81 to 0.87. See appendix for 
items of the PS. 
Psychosis Attachment Measure (PAM): This is a 16-item measure developed 
by Berry (2006), and validated with a large analogue sample. Participants are asked 
to rate the extend to which each item is characteristic of them using a four-point 
Likert scale (1 = ‘not at all’ to 4 = ‘very much’). A factor analysis revealed that, 
after the exclusion of one item, a two-factor solution was most fitting. One of the 
factors represents attachment anxiety and the other avoidance. The internal 
consistency of each dimension is acceptable. Cronbach’s alpha (Berry, 2006) for the 
anxiety and avoidance dimension is 0.82 and 0.75 respectively. Anxiety and 
avoidance subscale scores are derived by averaging scores for the 9 anxiety and 6 
avoidance items. See appendix for the 15 items of the PAM. 
The Early Life Experiences Scale (ELES): This scale was developed by 
Gilbert et al. (2003) to measure recall of personal feelings of perceived threat and 
subordination in childhood. The scale is made up of 15 items, that are best described 
by a three factor model. The first factor relates mostly to perceived threat (e.g. ‘In 
order to avoid getting hurt I used to try to avoid my parents’). The second factor 
includes six items that related to submissive behaviour, such as, ‘I often had to go 
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along with others even when I did not want to’ and ‘I often had to give in to others 
at home’. A third factor loads on the three items, ‘feeling equal, feeling relaxed, and 
able to assert self in the family’, and are referred to as (un)valued. Subsequent 
reliability analysis of the three subscales revealed a Cronbach alpha of 0.89 for 
threat, 0.85 for submissiveness and 0.71 for (un)valued. This measure presents a 
departure from traditional measures which investigate recall of parental behaviour. 
The authors argue that different people can recall parental behaviour in a certain 
way, but have very different feelings associated with these memories. In a study 
evaluating the ELES ability to predict psychopathology, the measure proved to 
correlate positively with a measure of depression in a student population. However, 
a regression analysis into which both the ELES and a recall of parenting behaviour 
measure were entered, only the submissive factor of the ELES predicted depression. 
The ELES proves high correlation with recall of parental behaviour measure (short 
form of EMBU, Swedish acronym for my memories of upbringing; Arrindell et al., 
1999), and we therefore will not use a separate measure.  
Empathy quotient (EQ): The EQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2004) will be used to 
assess empathy. The EQ is a self-report questionnaire, containing 40 empathy items 
and 20 filler items. On each empathy item a person can score 2, 1, or 0, so the EQ 
has a maximum score of 80 and a minimum score of zero.  The EQ has a high test–
retest reliability (r = 0.835; Lawrence et al., 2004). It has further been shown to be 
associated with performance on the Eyes Task (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), a non-
verbal mental state inference test. The EQ also has a moderate association with the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Scale (Davis, 1980), another tool measuring empathy. 
These results indicate concurrent validity. Lawrence et al. (2004) report, that only 
three EQ items correlated with the Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 
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1960), indicating that the EQ has a satisfactory construct validity. The EQ can be 
reduced to several factors (Lawrence et al., 2004) which overlap with  traditional 
ideas of empathy: cognitive empathy (includes items that measure the appreciation 
of others’ affective states), emotional reactivity (includes items of emotional 
reaction in response to others’ mental states) and social skills (includes items that 
explore the spontaneous use of social skills and/or a lack of intuitive social 
understanding). A recent confirmatory factor analytic study by Muncer and Ling 
(2006) further allow an additional analysis of the EQ items, providing a separate 
score for affective and cognitive empathy. See appendix for EQ. 
Social Comparison Scalre (SCS): The SCS was developed by Allan and 
Gilbert (1995) and dimensions of social comparison are measured, focusing on 
judgments of social rank, relative attractiveness and group fit. Cronbach alpha for 
the 11 item scale was 0.91 for a student sample (Allan et al., 1995). The 11 items 
load on a two factor structure solution, with Factor 1 mainly related to rank 
constructs (inferior-superior, incompetent-competent, untalented-more talented, 
weaker-stronger and unconfident-more confident) and Factor 2 to social group fit 
(outsider-insider, left out-insider, and different-same.). Items measuring social 
attractiveness were found to load on both factors. See appendix for items of the 
SCS. 
 The International Positive and Negative Affect Schedule, short-form (I-
PANAS-SF): The PANAS is self-report measure of positive and negative affect 
developed by Watson, Clark, and Tellegen (1988b). NA and PA reflect dispositional 
dimensions, with high-NA being marked by subjective distress and unpleasurable 
engagement, and low NA by the absence of these feelings. By contrast, PA 
represents the extent to which an individual experiences pleasurable engagement 
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with the environment. PANAS NA and PA scales index two distinct, but moderately 
negatively correlated, factors (Crawford et al., 2004). Thompson (2007) developed a 
10-item international short-form, which will be used in this study. PA and NA 
subscales had Cronbach’s alphas of, respectively, 0.78 and 0.76, indicating adequate 
reliability. The test-retest coefficient of reliability for both the PA and NA subscales 
is 0.84, suggesting acceptable medium temporal stability. Participants are asked to 
‘Thinking about yourself and how you normally feel, to what extent do you 
generally feel;’ and then are presented with 10 different words (e.g. hostile, 
inspired). Items are answered on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (always feel 
like this) to 5 (never feel like this). See appendix for items of the I-PANAS-SF. 
Design 
This study will use an analogue cross-sectional cohort design. A range of variables 
will be measured (paranoid thinking score, cognitive and affective empathy scores, 
recall of parental caring and attachment style). 
Research procedures 
Participants will complete questionnaire based measurements online. 
Justification of sample size 
As this study does not involve a clear comparison of two or more groups, effect size 
and power calculation are not readily possible. There are no agreed conventions for 
estimating effect size and thus the sample size requirements in covariance modeling. 
However, there are two studies with non-clinical samples that guide my decision. 
Firstly, Henry et al. (2008) investigated the relationship between schizotypy and 
empathy, both purely questionnaire based tools, with a sample size of N = 223. 
Secondly, MacBeth et al. (2008) recruited 213 participants in their analogue study 
investigating attachment style and psychotic phenomenology. I therefore aim to 
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recruit up to 250 participants. 
Settings and equipment 
Data collection for this research will involve participants completing self-report 
questionnaires. These will be hosted online on a commercially available survey tool 
(www.surveymonkey.com). Participants will be contacted via email and asked to 
volunteer in participation. Participants can then choose to follow the link embedded 
in the email to take part in the study.  
Data analysis 
Data will be screened for normality. In a non-clinical populations, the main 
dependent variable of paranoia is expected to be positive skewed, and therefore 
correction for non-normal distribution will be applied were required. The primary 
analytic method for this study will be structural equation modeling. SEM permits 
simultaneous assessment and prediction of several dependent variables within a 
single model. SEM is a hypotheses testing or confirmatory approach to data analysis 
where a theoretical model of the relationship of dependent and predictor variables is 
hypothesised and subsequently tested how well a model fits the data. 
Health and safety issues 
Researcher safety issues: No safety issues arise for the researcher. 
Participant safety issues: Some of the measurements of psychological 
constructs (e. g. PS, EQ, RQ, s-EMBU) may give rise to distressing thinking 
processes in some participants. In order to provide for this situation, participants will 
receive some information on the information and consent form prior to testing (i. e. 
names and contact numbers for organisations they can contact, as well as contact 
email of the investigator and her supervisor).   
Ethical issues (including where submission will be made) 
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Application for ethical approval will be made to the University of Glasgow Faculty 
of Medicine Ethics Committee. As none of the participants will be selected because 
of their links with the NHS (for example, through GP surgeries), no separate 
application to any further body will be made. Participants will have to give informed 
consent. After receiving an information page they will be asked to tick a box to 
indicate consenting to participation before starting any part of the study. This study 
will not involve any form of deception of participants as to the true nature of the 
investigation. Participants will be informed that they are free to withdraw form the 
investigation at any point. Should participants contact the investigators regarding a 
mental health query, a standardised response will be sent to the participant, 
informing them of pathways to access mental health and other support services (e.g. 
contacting their GP, Breathing space Scotland). In order to protect participants’ 
confidentiality, no personal data will be stored. 
Financial issues 
Equipment costs, travel etc.: The only cost for data collection will be for 
maintenance of an online survey software and hosting space 
(www.surveymonkey.com). This will be covered by a monthly fee of £ 13.20 GBP 
(current equivalent of $ 19.95 USD), and over three months will accumulate to a 
total of £ 39.60 GBP. No travel costs will be incurred.  
Time table 
Preparation of test material: September to November 2009. Data collection: 
December 2009 to end of February 2010. Data analysis: March/April 2010. Report 
writing: May/June 2010.  
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Practical applications 
This study will involve a non-clinical sample, and therefore clinical implications 
might seem limited. However as there is growing evidence for a symptomatic 
continuum between paranoid thinking in subjects from the general population, and 
clinical cases of paranoid delusions, there results might inform future therapeutic 
developments. In addition, non-clinical symptoms have been known to be associated 
with an increased likelihood of being diagnosed with a psychotic disorder (Van Os 
et al., 2000). Therefore, further study of paranoid thinking in a non-clinical 
population will potentially shed light on clinically relevant questions, as well as 
inform on factors that increase the likelihood of becoming unwell. We hypothesise 
that higher levels of paranoid thinking might be related to lower levels of empathy, 
with might contribute to the maintenance of paranoid thinking. Should this be the 
case, then this might indicate a therapeutic focus on enhancing the ability to 
empathise with others. We will be able to observe whether the rates of paranoid 
thinking reported in the literature (10-15% in general population), are reflected in a 
Scottish student sample. 
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Captions 
Figure 1. Model 1. 
Figure 2. Model 2.  
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Abstract 
This is a personal account of my experience and reflection on working in a team for 
looked after and accommodated children, and more specifically the effect working 
with traumatised children. With the help of an adapted version of Gibbs’ (1988) 
model of reflection, I reflected on a number of situations and intrapersonal 
experiences. In this reflective account I document this process and in addition tie my 
personal experience and reflection in with relevant literature on this topic. 
Overall the reflective process on working with traumatised children has allowed me 
to develop an increased understanding of my needs and functioning as a clinical 
psychologist on a personal level. It however also allowed me to gain greater insight 
into other professionals that are even more exposed to direct work with traumatised 
children. This increased understanding has helped me be more able to empathise 
with other professionals in consultations. More specifically it allowed me to gain 
insight into why some of the care pathways for looked after children seem so 
blocked.  
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Abstract 
This is a personal account of my experience and reflection on working with a 
refugee in an adult mental health setting. Boud et al.’s (1996) model of reflection 
aided me in revisiting experiences and feelings, and relating them to what I already 
know and new material I discovered in my reflective work. It helped me consider 
options and choices for future action. My reflective account focuses on three main 
areas: language, culture and systemic issues, and how they impact on the 
accessibility of mental health services to refugees. With respect to language I reflect 
mainly on the difficulties of working through an interpreter. Language however is 
also a barrier when it comes to communicating about the psychological world of 
clients. This is very much embedded in the culture of a person, reflecting their 
concepts of the mental world, and mental wellbeing. Culture in the more wider sense 
is yet another barrier, as we are so embedded in our own culture that this might get 
in the way of being able to formulate a client’s need (or psychological pain) with 
full regard of their own context (i.e. culture). Finally, on a service level I reflected 
on possibly incorrect preconceptions of what needs refugees have. I have found the 
reflection on work with refugees as very stimulating to think about how embedded I 
am personally and professionally in my context and culture. 
